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Arctic Sustainability Law: Almost Sufficient
Joseph F. C. DiMento†, Melissa L. Kelly††, and Kaitlin
O’Donnell††
Abstract
We review the existing regime of Arctic governance addressing
environmental protection, and more generally, sustainability. We
identify gaps in the regime and make recommendations for
initiatives to fill those gaps. These initiatives include many being
considered at the international level. Preliminarily, we describe
present and predicted conditions in the region going beyond
traditional environmental indicators to include understandings of
sustainability and incorporating various cultures.
Our work is multidisciplinary. In addition to legal research and
analysis, we incorporate environmental science and environmental
policy findings from our UCI survey [n~220] on Arctic experts’
priorities on environmental governance strategies in the region, an
ongoing series of international and U.S. convenings on Arctic
governance, attendance at Arctic organization meetings, and site
visits.
Our analysis of gaps in Arctic sustainability law requires
returning to the questions of “what is the goal of sustainability?”
Because the Arctic is not one Arctic state but encompasses the many
interests of all the Arctic states, indigenous peoples, and non-Arctic
states, our analysis is based on a policy position that Arctic law and
governance and its future must accommodate to more than any
individual interest group.
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A. Introduction
The Arctic is a region of remarkable beauty, diversity, history,
and complexity. Diversity is found in its climate, economic
conditions, demographics, the physical and mental health of its
citizens, and the nature of its governing structures. Environmental
conditions and characteristics, from the quality of its lands and
waters to the resilience of its flora and fauna, also vary within the
Arctic. This is a region whose ocean covers fourteen million square
kilometers (almost five and a half million square miles). Including
land, it is thirty-seven million square kilometers (over fourteen
million square miles). Four million people, including members of
dozens of indigenous peoples groups, live in the Arctic. Although
small, the population is made up of hundreds of distinct peoples
including indigenous peoples who have called it home for
centuries.1
To different degrees the Arctic has been the object of global
interest over the centuries. Today it is a major focus of global peace
and security in the countries that constitute it and more generally in
the global community. Its geopolitical importance is great. Also,
and the subject of this article, against rapid environmental, social,
economic, and political change, a major world concern is its
sustainability. Here we address whether the existing Arctic
governance regime is sufficient to reach that goal, understood in
varying ways by Arctic inhabitants, stakeholders, and followers.
In the sections that follow, we review the existing regime of
Arctic governance addressing environmental protection and, more
1 Throughout the article, we mainly use the term indigenous. Where appropriate,
we employ native or aboriginal. The histories and politics of first peoples are complex.
We attempt to use the terms that they and the documents which describe them employ.
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generally, sustainability. This includes an expansive array of laws,
rules, and practices from international laws to local agreements
among indigenous peoples groups, governments, and businesses.
Despite this multi-layered legal regime, there are gaps in protections
of the Arctic seas, particularly in areas beyond national jurisdiction
and from offshore energy installations. Protections of cultural
resources are insufficient, environmental impact assessments need
to be strengthened, and indigenous knowledge and perspectives are
still missing from important aspects of law and policymaking.
Many of these protections need to be grounded in an ecosystembased approach, one that links social and ecological strategies. To
fill these gaps, we offer recommendations surrounding existing
agreements, treaties, and other laws. These pertain to fisheries, oil
pollution, biodiversity, environmental impact assessment, and
human rights. They address also establishment of marine protected
areas and a regional seas agreement and greater incorporation of
indigenous perspectives and ecosystem-based management in
Arctic sustainability law. Many of these ideas are currently being
considered at the international level. Our analysis of the gaps in
Arctic sustainability law requires returning to the question of “what
is the goal of sustainability?” Because the Arctic is not one Arctic
state, but rather encompasses many interests in all of the Arctic
states, indigenous peoples, and non-Arctic states, our analysis is
based on a policy position that Arctic law and governance and their
future must accommodate to more than any individual interest
group.
Our review of existing Arctic sustainability law and governance
is based on traditional means of legal research. It is guided by an
expansive understanding of what governs attempts at Arctic
sustainability and environmental protection.2 We also undertook a
survey of experts on the Arctic,3 and convened workshops with the

See infra Section D.
We undertook a survey soliciting the views of experts on Arctic governance with
a focus on analysis that can advance policy consideration. We address our
recommendations for Future Rules, Section F, based in part on general trends in expert
answers. Because of the nature of the responding group, no statistical significance is
attributed to quantitative results. We used “judgment sampling” (or purposive sampling).
Judgment sampling is a common nonprobability method of obtaining a sample based on
an assessment of what best represents the population of interest. Judgment sampling
requires expert knowledge of the specific subject matter.
The population of individuals with sufficient expertise to answer the questions proposed
2
3
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University of California Irvine (UCI) School of Law Center for
Land, Environment, and Natural Resources and the UCI Newkirk
Center for Science and Society on specific strategies for Arctic
governance.4 We attended and participated in Arctic organization
meetings on law and governance, and undertook site visits in the
Arctic regions of each of the Arctic nations.
Sections B and C describe present and predicted conditions in
the region, going beyond traditional environmental indicators to
include understandings of sustainability in terms of the cultural and
socio-economic landscape. Section D lays out the most important
aspects of Arctic sustainability law and summarizes their
in the Arctic Environmental Governance Survey was created using a combination of
approaches. We first compiled a list of all government officials at the federal level in 21
countries who focused on or whose work is relevant to Oceans and Arctic policy within
state or foreign affairs agencies, as well as within any separate agency that contained a
special focus on the oceans, such as a national oceanic and atmospheric administration.
The countries were Canada, the United States, Russia, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Sweden,
Denmark/Greenland, France, Germany, the Italian Republic, Japan, the Netherlands, the
People’s Republic of China, Poland, the Republic of India, the Republic of Korea, the
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. We then extracted
contact information for agencies where available.
The second parallel round of sample selection involved identifying organizations with foci
on the oceans and/or Arctic regions, irrespective of organization size. We also selected
research units within universities and individuals whose specific research interests fit
within Arctic environmental governance. In addition, we identified potential survey
respondents through searches of relevant Arctic related publications (the authors) and
conference programs and presentations on relevant topics. Some of these were identified
through our direct participation in Arctic programs and through travels to Arctic regions
where we interviewed policymakers, scientists, indigenous peoples, and academics.
We incorporated helpful suggestions related to communication, and clarity, and the
probability of a response.
After our pre-tests, we invited contacts to participate in the online survey and to suggest
names of colleagues who may have interest in the subject matter of the survey.
The survey was administered through the University of California’s survey system. It
opened for response on August 29, 2018; results here reflect comments through late
October 2019. We sent 1,440 requests and we received 220 completed responses. To
maximize participation, we sent individually addressed email letters to contacts, once for
the initial contact, and a second time as a reminder within 1-3 weeks from the initial contact
question.
4 See Environmental Governance and Management in the Arctic, U.C. IRVINE SCH.
L. CTR. LAND, ENV’T, & NAT. RES., https://www.law.uci.edu/centers/cleanr
/events/workshops.html [https://perma.cc/3776-7MKA] (last visited Oct. 8, 2021); Legal
Strategies to Address Climate Change in the North American Arctic, U.C. IRVINE SCH. L.
CTR. LAND, ENV’T, & NAT. RES., https://www.law.uci.edu/centers/cleanr
/events/workshops.html [https://perma.cc/3776-7MKA] (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
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effectiveness. Section E identifies gaps in this vast legal regime and
corresponding recommendations for addressing those gaps, and
Section F is our Conclusions.
B. The Arctic Introduced and Described
The Arctic Ocean, about the size of Antarctica, if superimposed
on the United States, would overlap it one and a half times. The
Arctic encompasses every time zone. Walrus, seals, reindeer,
caribou, seabirds, and 150 species of fish live within the region. In
total, 21,000 known species of all kinds are found there, some new
and invasive.
The Arctic includes tens of thousands of islands, some of which
have zero population, some of which have seasonal populations, and
some of which have populations year-round. New land areas,
mainly islands, are regularly discovered in the Arctic.5
Only .00051% of humanity calls the Arctic home, yet there are
cities in the Arctic, some of which are very industrial, where
thousands of people live.6 North of the Arctic Circle there are ten
cities with 30,000 or more people, but many Arctic communities are
very small.7 The most northern settlement in the world is there.
Permafrost—the once thought forever-frozen layer under the
Earth’s surface made up of soil, gravel, and sand bound together by
ice—covers large parts of the Arctic, in some places up to one
thousand meters, or more than six tenths of a mile.8 Some wetlands
sparsely dot the immense region, as do boreal forests made up of

5 See Audrey Ramming, Russian Navy Confirms Emergence of Five New Islands in
the Arctic Ocean, GLACIERHUB (Nov. 21, 2019), https://glacierhub.org/2019/11/21
/russian-navy-confirms-emergence-of-five-new-islands-in-the-arctic-ocean
[https://perma.cc/5C2E-7CKS]. In recent years, the Russian Navy has discovered over
thirty islands, bays, capes, straits, and new islands in the archipelagos of Novaya Zemlya
and Franz Josef Land. See id. One of these islands is 54,500 square meters or about 65
thousand square yards. See id.
6 Author calculation is based on world population data and various sources
including the National Snow and Ice Data Center. See All About Arctic Climatology and
Meteorology,
NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR.
(May
4.
2020),
https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/arctic-people.html
[https://perma.cc/B53A-9WP2].
7 See SUSAN JOY HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 6 (2004).
8 Permafrost,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC,
https://www.nationalgeographic.org
/encyclopedia/permafrost/ [https://perma.cc/6BKT-T3CX] (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
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coniferous trees.9 Further, the Arctic is home to important minerals:
gemstones, nickel, copper, platinum, apatite, tin, diamonds, gold,
lead, zinc, and copper.10 One fifth of the world’s oil and gas
resources are in the Arctic.11 There is much sand and gravel.
Unlike Antarctica, which is land surrounded by water, the Arctic
is more than a sea surrounded by land: it is a region. There is no
universally accepted definition of what the region includes. It may
be demarcated by the tree line: the northernmost boundary where
trees grow. It may be defined by temperatures: the southernmost
location where the mean temperature of the warmest month of the
year is below 10° C (50° F).12 The Arctic Circle currently begins at
66°33′43″ N (its precise coordinates depend on the tilt of the Earth’s
axis which changes with time). The North Pole is at 90° N, 0° E. 13
For certain purposes, the Arctic is defined by memberships in
international or regional organizations.
To understand the environment of the sea and to think about its
future requires knowing about the land that touches that sea. That
land is, first, the territory of the Arctic Five—the countries that have
Arctic coastline. These are the littoral states: Norway, Greenland
(through its relationship with Denmark),14 the United States,
Canada, and Russia. The three other Arctic nations are Sweden,
Iceland, and Finland, whose economies and cultures are heavily

9 See Percent Forest Cover in the Boreal Forest Biome, DATA BASIN,
https://databasin.org/maps/new#datasets=d842914b159244e8829677eaf5ea62eb
[https://perma.cc/US3S-5BSJ] (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
10 See HASSOL, supra note 7, at 83.
11 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, USGS FACT SHEET 2008–3049 (2008).
12 See Lorna Inniss & Alan Simcock et al., The First Global Integrated Marine
Assessment:
World
Ocean
Assessment
I,
UNITED
NATIONS
28,
https://www.un.org/regularprocess/sites/www.un.org.regularprocess/files/woacompilatio
n.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEA6-DSF5] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
13 Ashley Strickland, Earth’s Magnetic North Pole is Heading for Russia and
Scientists
Are
Puzzled,
CNN
(Dec.
18,
2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/18/world/magnetic-north-pole-drift-scn-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6H5K-U8W8] (“Unlike its geographical poles, Earth’s magnetic poles
that serve as the foundation of our navigation are actively moving. The north magnetic
pole has been slowly moving across the Canadian Arctic toward Russia since 1831 . . . .
Since its discovery in 1831, the pole has traveled 1,400 miles. The magnetic field reverses
its polarity every several hundred thousand years.”).
14 At 62°00’N, the Faroe Islands between Norway and Iceland are about 4° south of
the official boundary of the Arctic Circle. But its government has an Arctic policy, and
the Faroe Islands is part of a delegation called Denmark/Greenland/Faroe Islands.
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influenced by the Arctic, its weather, its climate, its indigenous and
at least some nomadic peoples. These nations also have legal power
over activities in the Arctic Sea under international law.15 The
larger group is known as the Arctic Eight.
The Arctic coastline is about 45,000 kilometers or about 28,000
miles long.16 One starting point for thinking about the ocean
element of the region is to realize that it is part of “one single
interconnected ocean system: the Arctic Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean,
the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.”17 The Arctic itself is the
world’s smallest and most shallow ocean: its average (mean) depth
is 1,205 meters, just shy of 4,000 feet.18 The deepest point in the
Arctic is the Molloy Deep at 5,607 meters or 18,400 feet. 19 The
ocean element of the Arctic are the waters semi-enclosed by the
North American and Eurasian landmasses. What is called the Arctic
Ocean includes many water bodies; which are not exactly agreed
upon by all experts. Generally, they include the Baffin Bay, the
Barents Sea, the Beaufort Sea, the Chukchi Sea, the East Siberian
Sea, the Greenland Sea, Hudson Bay, Hudson Strait, the Kara Sea,
the Laptev Sea, the White Sea, the Northwest Passage, and other
tributary water bodies.20
The shortest distance between Russia’s mainland and mainland
Alaska, the Bering Strait of the Pacific, is about fifty-five miles
(88.5 kilometers). In the Bering Strait are two small islands: Big
Diomede and Little Diomede. Big Diomede is Russian, Little
Diomede is part of the United States; two and a half miles, or about
four kilometers, separate these small places. A good snowmobiler
could move from one nation to the other in a minute and a half.21 In
Lapland—the region in the Arctic including Norway, Sweden,
See infra Section D.
See Inniss & Simcock, supra note 12, ch. 1, at 2.
17 See id. Recently, some have been identifying the waters around Antarctica as the
Southern Ocean. See id., ch. 4, at 7.
18 See id., ch. 36G, at 1.
19 Jason Daley, American Becomes First to Visit the Five Deepest Spots in World’s
Oceans, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smartnews/american-descends-five-deepest-spots-worlds-oceans-180973094
[https://perma.cc/A4W4-X6RZ].
20 See Inniss & Simcock, supra note 12, ch. 36G, at 1.
21 See How Close is Alaska to Russia?, ALASKA PUB. LANDS INFO. CTRS.,
https://www.alaskacenters.gov/contact/faq/how-close-alaska-russia
[https://perma.cc/UQM7-XWSL] (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
15
16
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Finland and parts of Russia—the distance from Northern Finland to
Sweden or Norway or Russia is no more than several miles.
Twenty-five kilometers, or about sixteen miles, separate Franklin
Island in Greenland and Ellesmere Island in Canada.
Distances are also great in the Arctic. Shipping routes include
the Northeast Passage which goes along the coasts of Norway,
Russia, and Alaska, including, from west to east, the Barents
Sea, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea, and Chukchi Sea.
The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is the Russian section between the
Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Along the Russian coast, the
route extends from Siberia and the Far East, from the Atlantic to the
Pacific. Another route is the Northwest Passage along the northern
coast of North America which spans nine-hundred miles.
The Arctic has remained persistently cold, and its temperature
has not ranged greatly in modern history.22 For some parts of the
Arctic, there have been eras of warming and cooling. Twentieth
century shifts in atmospheric circulation patterns contributed to
effecting warm decades in the 1930s and 1940s, and cool decades
in the 1950s and 1960s.23 Recently, the Arctic has been less cold
than usual in certain places. For example, in northern Russia, mean
temperatures in January almost everywhere are below -10 °C (14
°F), and as low as -45 °C (-49 °F) in the Eastern inland areas.24
Significant differences exist. Parts of Canada and Greenland
surrounding the Labrador Sea have seen cooling in recent years. In
the Canadian Arctic, summer temperatures over the last century
were the highest they have ever been in tens of thousands of years.
Precipitation varies. Fairbanks, Alaska gets about eleven inches
of rain per year and about sixty-five inches of snow (1651 mm).25
Greenland experiences light snow in the North and Center and a
little more south of the Arctic Circle, along the coasts, and at high
altitudes on the ice sheet.26 In some parts of the Arctic, including
Canada, snowfall can be over 120 inches, or about three meters.
Many places experience considerable fog and are damp.
22 Over geological time, there were periods of tropical conditions, which explain the
existence of gas and oil deposits.
23 HASSOL, supra note 7, at 32.
24 See id. at 112.
25 See id. at 53.
26 See Climate–Greenland, CLIMATES TO TRAVEL, https://www.climatestotravel.com
/climate/greenland [https://perma.cc/2GRD-FVFT] (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
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The Arctic can be divided into four sub regions. East
Greenland, northern Scandinavia, northwestern Russia and the
Barents Sea constitute region one. The second region is the area
from the Urals to Chukotka in Central Siberia, the Barents, Laptev,
and East Siberian Seas. Region three is Chukotka, Alaska, the
western Canadian Arctic to the Mackenzie River, and the Bering,
Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas. Eastern Canada and West Greenland
make up the fourth region.27
The Arctic Sea is ice, averaging about three meters thick, four
to five meters (twelve to fifteen feet) at its thickest. In the summer,
parts of the sea are open, increasingly so in recent years.
A high percentage of the ocean floor is continental shelf, that is,
the edge of the land area that extends underwater. The remainder
of the ocean consists of two principal deep basins that are
subdivided into four smaller basins. The central of these ridges
extends 1,100 miles (1,770 km) from the continental shelf off
Ellesmere Island to the New Siberian Islands—Eastern Siberia to
Nunavut Canada.28 This gigantic mountain range in the sea was
discovered around 1950.
Currents in the ocean influence its climate and diversity. The
Arctic has a clockwise movement or drift pattern in the Beaufort
Gyre in the western part of the Arctic Ocean.29 A nearly straightline Transpolar Drift Stream moves eastward across the ocean from
the New Siberian Islands to the Fram Strait, between Greenland and
Svalbard.30
Arctic places are continuously dark in the winter and light in the
summer. Above the Arctic Circle, there are twenty-four hours of
daylight in the summer and twenty-four hours of darkness in the
winter.31

HASSOL, supra note 7, at 113.
See id. at 89.
29 See Lawrence A. Mysak, Patterns of Arctic Circulation, 293 SCI. MAG. 1269,
1269–70 (2001).
30 See id.
31 See Daylight, Darkness and Changing Seasons at the North Pole, NOAA: PAC.
MARINE.
ENV’T
LAB’Y
ARCTIC
ZONE,
https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/arcticzone/gallery_np_seasons.html [https://perma.cc/4MJQ-C82Y] (last visited Nov. 12,
2021).
27
28
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C. The Arctic Conditions Addressed by Law: Environment
Broadly Appreciated
Environmental concerns lie at the heart of the laws governing
the Arctic. The Arctic environment includes physical aspects of the
land such as water, air, plants, and animals, but also the people and
cultures that inhabit the land. The focus at both national and
international levels is to increase sustainability efforts for the Arctic
environment so that the qualities that make the Arctic unique are not
lost to a range of stressors including, but not limited to, the effects
of climate change.
Whether actions and development are sustainable depends on
the definition of sustainability. In its report, the World Commission
on Environment and Development stated “[s]ustainable
development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending
to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life” and
also “requires the promotion of values that encourage consumption
standards that are within the bounds of the ecological possible and
to which all can reasonably aspire.”32
Sustainable Arctic
development has three goals: “economic development, social
development, and environmental protection.”33
The broader understanding of sustainable Arctic development
includes the sustainability of Arctic cultures; cultural sustainability
is a touchstone that distinguishes the Arctic peoples’ goals.
Sustaining people, cultures, and traditions is entirely compatible
with protecting the Arctic’s physical environment, yet pursuing
these goals can come into tension with some of the classic views of
environmental protection. Industrial projects, such as construction
of infrastructure, highways, energy facilities, and mining, can
damage the environment and disrupt lifestyles and traditions;
however, they also generate employment and funds to improve
education, provide healthcare, and make daily life more comfortable
for many of the Arctic’s inhabitants. In addition, pursuing some
environmental objectives, such as the protection of species, at times,
leads to clashes with traditional practices of hunting, herding, and
whaling.34
32 U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the World Commission on Environment and
Development: Our Common Future, §§ 15, 27, A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987).
33 Arctic Council, Fairbanks Declaration, May 11, 2017, 13 I.L.M 6.
34 See infra Section D (discussing these tensions, including with regards to hunting
of seals).
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While the understanding of environmental sustainability may
differ in various regions of the Arctic, a common goal is abundantly
clear: maintaining the aspects that make the Arctic so special
requires laws that protect physical and cultural landscapes.
1. The Physical Landscape
The Arctic is on the front line of climate change. Arctic climate
change is occurring at a pace twice as intense as in other regions in
the world: the Arctic is getting warmer; ice on land and in the sea is
receding; permafrost is no longer permanent; weather patterns are
shifting; shores are eroding; some native plants and animals are
being lost, and new plants and animals are being gained; fire season
is becoming longer; there is a hole in the ozone layer; and waters
are becoming more acidic and polluted in parts, and more
radioactive in others due to the circulation of industrial and
agricultural chemicals. The manner and speed at which the Arctic
environment is changing is one of the primary concerns in the
region.
a. Biodiversity
The Arctic is less rich in biodiversity than lower regions, and
specialists say it is “patchy,” meaning the variety of biological
resources differs with the subregion.35 Biodiversity also increases
with higher altitudes.36
Arctic ecosystems are rather young. Still, over 21,000 species
of fungi, plants, and animals find their homes in the Arctic.37 Since
some Arctic species have survived in extreme conditions over the
years, they are quite resilient to environmental change. Added to
this strength is the absence of major habitat disruptions caused by
human activity.
The Arctic is home to three dozen species of marine mammals:
the iconic narwhal, beluga, bowhead whale, ringed seal, bearded
seal, harp seal, and hooded seal which uses sea ice for pupping in
the winter and spring.38 These marine mammals move in open
35 See Andrei Boltunov, An Updated Look at Polar Bears in the Russian Arctic, THE
CIRCLE, Sept. 2018, at 14, 15.
36 See Cynthia Jacobson & Liisa Rohweder, 2018 Arctic Biodiversity Congress:
Working Together for a Better Future, THE CIRCLE, Sept. 2018, at 4, 5.
37 Arctic Council, Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, May 2013, 128 I.L.M. 9.
38 See generally Inniss & Simcock, supra note 12, at 1301–47.
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waters of the Arctic and sub-Arctic the rest of the year.39 Many
marine mammals depend on ice for at least some of the year, namely
for reproduction, molting, resting, and feeding.40 Arctic and
subarctic regions yield a tenth of the global commercial fish catch,
and subsistence fisheries provide support to Arctic residents.41
Warming temperatures are changing the landscape of the Arctic.
Shrubs are expanding in the tundra, making it greener and
decreasing vegetation in some areas. There are also more severe
fire years and more insect disturbances.42 Bark beetles are a species
that causes a great deal of damage in the Arctic.43 In southcentral
Alaska, the area where bark beetles attacked grew from 33,000 acres
in 2015 to 593,000 acres in 2018.44 Tree lines in northern Sweden
have moved up to eighty meters higher in the last decades. But not
every region has seen this movement. Forest decline has been
accelerated in some areas; in other places, forests have “pop[ped]
up.”45
Despite the increase of vegetation available for grazing in some
places, herd populations of caribou and wild reindeer across the
Arctic tundra declined by nearly 50% in the two-decade period
through 2018.46 Caribou die-offs occur in part because the animals
do not have access to food.

See id.
See id.
41 Reports to Arctic Council Confirm Rapid Warming, Ocean Acidification, WORLD
METEOROLOGICAL ORG. (May 7, 2019), https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/reportsarctic-council-confirm-rapid-warming-ocean-acidification
[https://perma.cc/XY3MSJWB].
42 See Emily Osborne et al., Arctic Report Card: Update for 2018, NOAA (2018),
https://arctic.noaa.gov/Portals/7/ArcticReportCard
/Documents/ArcticReportCard_full_report2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MY4-6MSJ]
[hereinafter Arctic Report Card].
43 See What’s Bugging Alaska’s Forest? Spruce Beetle Facts and Figures, ALASKA
DEP’T NAT. RES. DIV. FORESTRY, http://forestry.alaska.gov/insects/sprucebeetle
[https://perma.cc/H7VM-GJM3] (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
44 See id.
45 Bryan Walsh, How Climate Change Is Growing Forests in the Arctic, TIME (June
4, 2012), https://science.time.com/2012/06/04/how-climate-change-is-growing-forests-inthe-arctic [https://perma.cc/X74L-SJ34].
46 See Cody Sullivan, 2018 Arctic Report Card: Reindeer and Caribou Populations
Continue to Decline, NOAA CLIMATE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.climate.gov/newsfeatures/featured-images/2018-arctic-report-card-reindeer-and-caribou-populationscontinue [https://perma.cc/8ZFU-RAJ9].
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The Red List of the International Union for Conservation of
Nature gives information on threatened species worldwide.47 The
Red List includes thirteen Arctic or seasonal mammalian inhabitants
and twenty-one Arctic or Arctic-breeding seabirds as threatened
species.48 Eight fish stocks and five Arctic fish species meet the
Red List criteria.49 The Polar bear and walrus are “vulnerable,”
affected by, among other threats, residential and commercial
development.50 The Greenland shark is nearing threatened status.51
But some species are increasing in population, including the
humpback whale, the harp seal, and the bowhead whale.52
In the Bering Sea region, ocean primary productivity levels
(algae’s actions in changing inorganic carbon into organic things),
have sometimes been 500% higher than normal levels.53 Scientists
linked this to the low sea ice extent for the 2017/2018 season.54
b. The Arctic Ocean
Much of the Arctic region is ocean, but knowledge about oceans
in general is limited. In 2016, the United Nations published the
World Ocean Assessment,55 a comprehensive check of the marine
environment. This report pointed to several disturbing trends in
oceans generally and noted major gaps in how oceans are
understood.56 The report noted that the Central Arctic Ocean and
47 The IUCN Red List of Protected Species, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF
NATURE & NAT. RES. (2021), https://www.iucnredlist.org/ [https://perma.cc/SD7UGDHV] [hereinafter IUCN].
48 Id.
49 Id. See also Jorgen Christiansen, Catherine W. Mecklenburg, & Oleg V.
Karamushko, Arctic Marine Fishes and their Fisheries in Light of Global Change, 20
GLOB. CHANGE BIOLOGY 2, 352–59 (Sep. 17, 2013).
50 Polar Bear, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE & NAT. RES. (2021),
https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/22823/14871490 [https://perma.cc/B2N6-8UUD].
51 Greenland Shark, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE & NAT. RES.
(2021), https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/60213/124452872 [https://perma.cc/2RT7333U].
52 IUCN, supra note 47.
53 Arctic Report Card, supra note 42.
54 Id.
55 See Inniss & Simcock, supra note 12. There were a few substantive additions to
understanding of the Arctic from Assessment II. See Renison Ruwa & Alan Simcock et
al., The Second World Ocean Assessment: World Ocean Assessment II, UNITED NATIONS
(2021).
56 Inniss & Simcock, supra note 12.
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marginal seas “are among the least-known basins and bodies of
water in the world ocean, because of their remoteness, hostile
weather, and the multi-year (i.e., perennial) or seasonal ice cover.”57
What is known about the Arctic oceans has led experts to conclude
that they are stable and generally in good health.58
Arctic ice is disappearing at a dramatic rate. Since 1979, the
average period with sea ice cover dropped ten to twenty days every
decade; in some areas, the drops were much greater. 59 In 2015,
2016, 2017, and 2018, Arctic winter sea ice maximums were at
record low levels.60 In September 2018, the volume of Arctic sea
ice saw a decline of 75% from its 1979 levels.61 The United States
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported that the
twelve lowest sea ice extent levels in the satellite record occurred in
the past twelve years.62 Sea ice has been melting at a rate of 9% per
decade since the 1970s.63 There is a lot of variation in the sea levels:
in 2013 and 2014, the ice was relatively higher, but still much lower
than the levels in the 1980s and 1990s.64
This melting ice is hurting Arctic coastal areas in places like
Alaska where ice serves as a protection against waves that are
driven by winds and cause flooding.65 The Pacific sector of the
Arctic Ocean, Hudson Bay, and Baffin Bay all experience more
open water from August through December.66 In Alaska, ice levels
in the summer are about one tenth of what it was in the 1980s.67 In
early fall, the Chukchi Sea ice edge is now regularly hundreds of

Id. at ch. 36G, at 1.
Id.
59 ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, ARCTIC CLIMATE CHANGE
UPDATE 2019: AN UPDATE TO KEY FINDINGS OF SNOW, WATER, ICE, AND PERMAFROST IN
THE ARCTIC 5 (2019) [hereinafter ARTIC CLIMATE CHANGE UPDATE 2019].
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Arctic Report Card, supra note 42, at 2.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 47.
65 Dr. Steven Katona, The Big Melt: Global Warming and Sea Ice in the Arctic,
OCEAN HEALTH INDEX (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://www.oceanhealthindex.org/news/The_Big_Melt [https://perma.cc/L82N-YNKF].
66 Jason E. Box et al., Key Indicators of Arctic Climate Change: 1971-2017, 14
ENV’T. RSCH. LETTERS 1, 11 (2019).
67 Id.
57
58
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miles northwest of the Alaska coast.68 The Bering Sea is a particular
area of loss, and the remaining sea ice tends to be younger, thinner,
and more susceptible to melting.69
In 2019, Alaska saw the lowest levels of sea ice ever.70 Younger
and thinner seasonal ice leads to harm or loss of some species.
Other species are expanding their ranges or are present during a
longer portion of the year. The expanded open water season, which
is about three months longer than it was in the 1970s, promotes
shipping, commercial activities, resource development, and
tourism.71
The loss of sea ice changes how much heat is in the ocean, which
creates cascading effects on fisheries and ecosystems. Among the
people affected are more than seventy indigenous communities in
Alaska, including the Inupiat, Central Yupik, Cupik, St. Lawrence
Island Yupik, and Unangan peoples.
Compared to other seas and ocean areas, the Arctic is clean. But
there is much that we do not know about the Arctic Ocean, and there
are areas that are polluted in one or more forms. Until recently, ice
coverage hindered scientific exploration of the Arctic. Even now,
this vast entity is not mapped for pollution in any comprehensive or
sizable way. What we do know is that the waters are becoming
more acidic, common pollutants are present,72 spilled oil is
present,73 plastics are in the water,74 and radioactivity remains.75
Acidification is the reduction of the pH of seawater caused by

Id.
Id.
70 Id.
71 Box et al., supra note 66, at 11.
72 Id.
73 Jackie Northam, The Oil Spill From Russian Nickel Mine Is Moving Toward the
Arctic Ocean, NPR, https://www.npr.org/2020/06/16/878852931/the-oil-spill-fromrussian-nickel-mine-is-moving-towards-the-arctic-ocean [https://perma.cc/UJ7F-YCDP]
(last visited Oct. 30, 2021).
74 Helen Regan, From Norway to Canada, the Arctic Ocean is Being Polluted by
Tiny Plastic Fibers from Our Clothes, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/style/article/arcticpolyester-fibers-study-intl-hnk-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/FS9T-4MXR] (last
visited Oct. 30, 2021).
75 Radioactivity in the Arctic, ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME,
https://radioactivity.amap.no [https://perma.cc/9K4M-H6XG] (last visited Feb. 25, 2022)
[hereinafter Arctic Radioactivity].
68
69
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the increased absorption of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.76
Arctic acidity levels have been increasing at twice the rate of the
Pacific and Atlantic oceans.77 The change is rapid, but getting a true
sense of where change is occurring and what the stability of the
change is has been difficult.78 In some parts of the Arctic,
acidification has damaged fisheries.79 Yields of Norwegian kelp,
sea urchins, and sea cod are affected, and other subsistence fisheries
have been damaged.80
As in oceans generally, marine pollution is heavily caused by
activity on land.
Stain repellants, flame retardants, and
pharmaceuticals are found in the Arctic.81 Permafrost thaws and its
contents make their way to the ocean. In 2016, people started
worrying about plastics with the discovery of the massive Great
Pacific Garbage Patch. The world was both amazed and disgusted.
That “island” is not in the Arctic, but plastics have made their way
into Arctic waters.
Compared with the amounts in the
Mediterranean, there is not much plastic now, although abundant
concentrations are found in Greenland and the Barents Sea. Ocean
currents bring plastic there from faraway places. But part of the
plastic pollution is homemade.82
In some areas, the Arctic is contaminated by radioactive
material.83 Between 1945 and 1980, 520 atmospheric nuclear

LISA ROBBINS ET AL., MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT OF OCEAN ACIDIFICATION IN
1 (2010).
77 Id. See also DI QI ET AL., INCREASE IN ACIDIFYING WATER IN THE WESTERN ARCTIC
OCEAN 195 (2017).
78 Arctic
Ocean Acidification, NAT’L PARK SERV. (July 30, 2019),
https://www.nps.gov/articles/oceanacidification.htm [https://perma.cc/W7ME-EFA3].
79 Press Release: Studies Explore Socio-Economic Implications of Ocean
Acidification in the Arctic, ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (Oct. 10,
2018) https://www.amap.no/documents/download/3057/inline [https://perma.cc/KMK9S87D].
80 Id.
81 Bob Weber, Report Says Mercury, PCBs Still Threaten Arctic; New Chemicals
Emerging, CANADIAN PRESS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/reportsays-mercury-pcbs-still-threaten-arctic-new-chemicals-emerging-1.4134844
[https://perma.cc/C6UQ-C3DJ].
82 See Claudia Halsband & Dorte Herzke, Plastic Litter in the European Arctic: What
Do We Know?, 5 EMERGING CONTAMINANTS 308, 308 (2019).
83 See ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP ASSESSMENT 2002:
RADIOACTIVITY IN THE ARCTIC 9 (2004). See also DAVID P. STONE, THE CHANGING ARCTIC
ENVIRONMENT: THE ARCTIC MESSENGER 47 (2015).
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weapon tests were carried out by the United States, France, China,
and the Soviet Union.84 Dozens originated on the Arctic island of
Novaya Zemlya, and their fallout remains.85 Nuclear waste sunk in
the ocean included reactors, waste containers, and a submarine.86
Between 2007 and 2015, radioactive radium-228 concentration
grew in the Arctic.87 Contamination in the forms of thorium
isotopes is found in sediments on the massive Arctic continental
shelves, and while levels are not now threatening, some scientists
see them as a sign of negative trends.88
c. Arctic Landscape and Climate Change
Temperatures have varied in the Arctic throughout the twentieth
century. In the 1940s, the Arctic experienced a warm period with
annual surface temperature increases. Overall, the Arctic has been
warming more than twice as fast as the world as a whole for the past
fifty years.89 In the decades since 1971, the annual surface air
temperatures rose two and a half times faster than the average
temperature increase in the Northern Hemisphere.90
The Arctic warms faster than lower latitudes because the land is
darker, and the ocean surfaces absorb more solar energy when ice
and snow melt.91 This additional trapped energy increases warming
of the Arctic atmosphere, which is already shallower and less
effective in transporting energy than the atmosphere at lower
latitudes.92 Black carbon, a significant percentage of which

84 General Overview of the Effects of Nuclear Testing, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEARTEST-BAN TREATY ORG., https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nucleartesting/general-overview-of-theeffects-of-nuclear-testing/ [https://perma.cc/Z3GG-294U]
(last visited Oct. 30, 2021) [hereinafter Nuclear Testing].
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Lauren E. Kipp et al., Increased Fluxes of Shelf-Derived Materials to the Central
Arctic Ocean, 4 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 2 (2018).
88 Stephen Luntz, Global Warming is Increasing the Radioactivity of the Arctic
Ocean, IFL SCIENCE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.iflscience.com/environment/globalwarming-is-increasing-the-radioactivity-of-the-arctic-ocean/
[https://perma.cc/A9EAVBY9].
89 ARCTIC CLIMATE CHANGE UPDATE 2019, supra note 59, at 2.
90 Box et al., supra note 66, at 2.
91 HASSOL, supra note 7, at 20.
92 Id.
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originates in Europe, further exacerbates this dynamic.93
Alaska, Canada, and Central Arctic Russia are warming more
than other Arctic regions. The polar parts of Russia have become
almost 2.3C (4.14F) warmer over the past thirty years. In part of
the region, including the Kara Sea, average air temperatures from
1998–2018 were as much as 4.77C (8.59F) above normal.94 In
October 2019, the Russian archipelagos of Franz Josepf Land and
Severnaya Zemlya experienced the warmest month ever on record.95
There, average temperatures were up to 8C (14.4F) higher than
normal.96 In the winter, temperatures are up to 4C (7.2F) warmer in
Siberia and the western Canadian Arctic.97
An updated 2019 report confirmed that Arctic warming is
continuing unabated.98 Arctic annual surface air temperatures in
2014-2018 exceeded those of any year since 1900.99 Over the last
half century, the temperature of permafrost in parts of Alaska has
increased 2.5˚C (4.5˚F).100 In the Bering Sea, recent winters have
experienced marine heat waves. In one area of Alaska, on July 4,
2019, the temperature reached 32˚C (90˚F) for the first time on
record. In June 2020, the temperature in Verkhoyansk in Siberia hit
37.8C (100F).101
Not all Arctic regions were warmer. Norwegian meteorologists
concluded that October 2019 was the coldest month in the country
since 2009 and 2003.102 There has also been reported cooling in

93 Factsheet: Climate Change in the Arctic, Arctic Centre, FACTSHEET: CLIMATE
CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC, ARCTIC CENTRE (2014).
94 Atle Staalesen, Arctic Islands 8 Degrees Warmer than Normal, BARENTS
OBSERVER (Nov. 4, 2019), https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2019/11/arctic-islands-8degrees-warmer-norma [https://perma.cc/47GV-84F9].
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 HASSOL, supra note 7, at 113.
98 Arctic Climate Change Update 2019, supra note 59.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Anton Troianovski, A Historic Heat Wave Roasts Siberia, N.Y. TIMES (July 23,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/world/europe/siberia-heat-wave-climatechange.html [https://perma.cc/48S3-P9RV].
102 Atle Staalesen, Arctic Islands 8 Degrees Warmer than Normal, THE BARENTS
OBSERVER (Nov. 4, 2019), https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2019/11/arctic-islands-8degrees-warmer-norma [https://perma.cc/G692-RXFJ].
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Northwest Russia and Scandinavia.103
Precipitation is increasing in the Arctic by an estimated 1.5–2%
per decade.104 The increase from 1971 to 2017 in annual total
precipitation for areas north of 50˚N latitude has been greatest in the
cold season.105 The forms of precipitation are also changing. Snow
cover continues to decline in the Arctic; its annual duration has
dropped by two to four days per decade.106 In recent years, the June
snow area in the North American and Eurasian Arctic has been
about half the values observed before 2000.107 Overall, Arctic
spring snow cover extent on land has now decreased by more than
30% since 1971.108 Alaska now becomes half snow-covered a week
later in October than it used to in the 1990s; the snow is gone almost
two weeks earlier than a few decades ago.109 In Greenland and in
the Baltic Sea Basin, the loss in snowfall comes with a gain in
rain.110 However, this is not constant. In 2018, the snowfall in
Northern Greenland was twice as deep as it was in some earlier
years, and the snow did not melt until summer’s end.111
Land-based ice is also disappearing rapidly. Since 1971, Arctic
land ice loss accounted for almost half of sea-level rise during 2003
to 2010 and almost a third of the total sea-level rise since 1992.112
The Greenland ice sheet is a major source of sea level rise: on
average it has lost 375 gigatons of ice per year in recent years. 113
This is about two times the rate of loss from the period of 2003 to

See id.
Arctic Climate Change Update 2019, supra note 59, at 4.
105 Box et al., supra note 66, at 7.
106 Id. at 10.
107 See id.
108 Id.
109 Rick Thoman & John Walsh, Alaska’s Changing Environment: Documenting
Alaska’s Physical and Biological Changes Through Observations, H.R. MCFARLAND, ED.
INT’L ARCTIC RSCH. CTR. 7 (2019).
110 Id. at 8.
111 Adam Aton, Extreme Snows in Greenland Caused Ecosystem’s “Reproductive
Collapse”, SCI. AM. (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/extremesnows-in-greenland-caused-ecosystems-reproductive-collapse/ [https://perma.cc/BTX6W3DF].
112 See Box et al., supra note 66, at 11.
113 Paolo Colosio et al., Surface Melting Over the Greenland Ice Sheet Derived from
Enhanced Resolution Passive Microwave Brightness Temperatures (1979–2019), 15
CRYOSPHERE 2623, 2623-24 (2021).
103
104
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2008.114 However, in 2017 and 2018, Greenland may have added a
small amount of mass.115
Permafrost, ground that stays frozen for at least two successive
years, is an important carbon sink and is critical to climate.
However, when it thaws, permafrost releases more carbon than it
absorbs. Various studies have found that carbon escape from
permafrost in the Arctic has been accelerating,116 although one
study found no rise in emissions since 2003.117 Melting has led to
what scientists call a positive feedback cycle, meaning an initial
disturbance causes effects that return to cause some increase in the
magnitude of the initial disturbance.118 Since the period of 2007 to
2009, the near-surface permafrost in the High Arctic has warmed by
more than 9˚F or more than 2˚C.119 Furthermore, the layer of the
ground that thaws in the summer has deepened.120
Abrupt thaw, as scientists call this process, drastically changes
the landscapes. Abrupt thawing causes landslides, creating massive
ground slumps in some areas. Forests are affected by flooding,
which destabilizes tree trunks and roots.121 Trees get “drunk”—they
tip over and are swallowed by new wetlands.122 The effect on
buildings can be dramatic; in parts of Siberia in the past several
decades, the bearing capacity of some foundations has declined by
40–50%.123 In Yakutsk, hundreds of buildings have been damaged

114 See L. S. Sørensen et al., Mass Balance of the Greenland Ice Sheet (2003–2008)
from ICESat Data – The Impact of Interpolation, Sampling and Firn Density, 5
CRYOSPHERE 173, 184 (2011).
115 Arctic Climate Change Update 2019, supra note 59, at 8.
116 Paul Voosen, Global Impacts of Thawing Arctic Permafrost May be Imminent,
SCIENCE (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/10/global-impactsthawing-arctic-permafrost-may-be-imminent [https://perma.cc/7HCF-JZMB].
117 Id.
118 See Torben Windirsch, Organic Matter Characteristics in a Changing Permafrost
Environment: Yukechi Alas Landscape, Central Yakutia, EPIC 7 (Aug. 2018),
https://epic.awi.de/id/eprint/48337/1/Windirsch_Yukechi_mt.pdf.
119 See Box et al., supra note 66, at 6.
120 See id.
121 See Ian McDermod, The Drunk Trees of Climate Change, MEDIUM (Aug. 20,
2020),
https://medium.com/climate-conscious/the-drunk-trees-of-climate-change3b96cfc38ef [https://perma.cc/V9HX-UFRW].
122 See id.
123 ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, SNOW, WATER, ICE AND
PERMAFROST IN THE ARCTIC (SWIPA) xii (2017) [hereinafter AMAP ARCTIC REPORT].
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as they subside.124 Earth movements sink wooden houses and
concrete and steel infrastructure in pipelines, airports, and factories.
Coastal archeological sites are also rapidly deteriorating. The
results are eerie and dark, but their true environmental meaning is a
matter of some speculation. Surely lakes will appear and be filled
with new sediments, melting will release more climate change
gases, and mammoth skeletons will rise on the horizon.
In 2003, 86% of 213 Alaska Native villages were affected by
flooding or erosion.125 In 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
identified 178 communities as at risk from erosion alone (flooding
was not addressed).126 That same year, other government reports
concluded that many Native villages would need to relocate.127
Houses are falling into the sea and land mass is shrinking in parts of
Alaska.128
These new environmental conditions make for other
characteristics of the Arctic: there were several wildfires in
Greenland in 2017, including one that burned 1200 hectares of
tundra.129 The following year, Sweden experienced a heavier than
usual wildfire season. In the last half century, the number of
wildfires has risen in Canada’s Northwest Territories and interior
Alaska. In 2019, 2.6 million acres burned in Alaska, leading to the
first ever dense smoke advisory for particles in Anchorage.130
Relatively recently in 2006, fire managers in the state pushed up the
“start date” for wildfire response from May 1 to April 1.131
124 Aristos Georgiou, Siberia Heatwave Sees Buildings Split in Two as Permafrost
Thaws, NEWSWEEK (June 25, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/siberia-heatwavebuildings-split-permafrost-thaws-1513455 [https://perma.cc/QC4L-S5ZH].
125 See Thoman & Walsh, supra note 109, at 14.
126 CONG. RES. SERV., R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for
Congress, at 81 (Oct. 12, 2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf.
127 Id.
128 See id.
129 Ice and Fire: Large Blaze Burns in Greenland for Two Weeks, GUARDIAN (Aug.
19, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/20/ice-and-fire-large-blazeburns-in-greenland-for-two-weeks [https://perma.cc/29UX-FC7U].
130 Maddie Stone, Want to Know What Climate Change Feels Like? Ask an Alaskan,
GRIST (Oct. 8, 2019), https://grist.org/article/want-to-know-what-climate-change-feelslike-ask-an-alaskan/ [https://perma.cc/S4JN-FLAP].
131 Alison York, Alaska Fire Science Consortium Addresses Management
Information Needs, ARCTIC RES. CONSORTIUM U.S. (Feb. 28, 2020),
https://www.arcus.org/witness-the-arctic/2020/2/highlight/3
[https://perma.cc/93MQW4MC].
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d. Arctic Atmosphere
The history of international concern with the environment has
focused greatly on the atmosphere. Before the crucial attention to
climate change, the worry was about the “hole” in the ozone. The
hole was most dramatically described over Antarctica, but in the
Arctic, ultraviolet radiation has long been a concern.
Depletion of ozone over the region has been noted since the
early 1980s. For several years, particularly from 1979 to 2000, the
spring and yearly average ozone levels declined by 11% and 7%
respectively, and there have been years with dramatic losses of up
to 45%.132 The harmful effects of this change are numerous. A
weakened ozone layer induces cataracts, suppresses the human
immune system, and in some instances, causes cancer.133 It can
harm species of phytoplankton and disrupt agricultural
productivity.134
Scientists at the University of California, Irvine and elsewhere
discovered that the hole in the ozone was caused by substances such
as chlorofluorocarbons and other chemicals commonly used in
refrigerants, air conditioners in homes and automobiles, flame
retardants, and spray cans for products such as hair products.135 A
worldwide legal ban on the manufacture, use, and trade in such
substances followed.136
The status of the recovery of the ozone layer and its permanency
in the Arctic is difficult to determine with precision. In the Arctic,
mini ozone holes develop where, unlike at the South Pole, weather
pattern circulations rearrange the ozone.137 The process can last for
as little as a few days.138 Annual variations in the Arctic are making
132 Betsy Weatherhead et al., Ozone and Ultraviolet Radiation in ARCTIC CLIMATE
IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT 151, 152, 159 (2005).
133 See id. at 153.
134 See generally id. at 421, 812 (discussing the effects of climate change on aquatic
ecosystems and agriculture).
135 See James W. Elkins, Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH
SCIENCE (1999).
136 See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sep. 16, 1987,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
137 Andrej Flis, *Polar Watch* An Ozone Hole (Mini) has Formed over the North
Pole and Scandinavia! Ozone Levels have Dropped to over 50 Dobson Units Below
Normal, SEVERE WEATHER EUR. (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.severe-weather.eu/globalweather/polar-watch-scandinavia-arctic-ozone-hole-fa/ [https://perma.cc/WB4R-2743].
138 Id.
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the hole larger, making it hard to confirm whether there has been a
definite recovery in the layer since 2000.139 Anomalies do occur: in
2020, NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) reported the
largest hole of its kind ever detected, perhaps related to extreme
temperatures and unusual weather during the winter.140
The Arctic is contaminated by persistent organic pollutants
(POPs). These are industrial polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),
dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), other pesticides such as
aldrin, chlordane, dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, mirex, toxaphene,
dioxins, and furans.141 Levels of these chemicals are high in some
Arctic predator species, and other organisms including fish are
exposed to significant amounts of mercury and polychlorinated
biphenyls.142 Mercury in polar bears compromises their ability to
reproduce; a third of bears in the Beaufort Sea are at high risk.143
Their relatives in the Hudson Bay have unhealthy levels of PCB, as
do killer whales off the coast of northern British Columbia.144 Killer
whales are among the most high at risk species of PCB
contamination on earth.145
Some Arctic people are dependent on the marine environment
for their diet. Traditional indigenous diets include locally harvested
fish, birds, and marine mammals. Contaminants that are transported
to the Arctic by winds and ocean currents, including some that are

139 Ozone Layer is Healing, but Maybe Not in the Arctic Ozone Hole, UN Says, CBC
NEWS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/ozone-healing-1.4794803
[https://perma.cc/D3HE-95SU].
140 See Unusual Ozone Hole Opens Over the Arctic, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (June 4,
2020),
http://www.esa.int/Applications/Observing_the_Earth/Copernicus/Sentinel5P/Unusual_ozone_hole_opens_over_the_Arctic [https://perma.cc/54WR-9G58].
141 See ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF
CONTAMINANTS ON ARCTIC WILDLIFE & FISH: SUMMARY FOR POLICY-MAKERS (2018)
[hereinafter BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF CONTAMINANTS]; see also Persistent Organic
Pollutants:
A
Global
Issue,
a
Global
Response,
U.S.
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/persistent-organic-pollutants-globalissue-global-response [https://perma.cc/H652-3GMU] (last updated Dec. 2009)
[hereinafter Persistent Organic Pollutants].
142 BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF CONTAMINANTS, supra note 141.
143 Bob Weber, Report Says Mercury, PCBs Still Threaten Arctic; New Chemicals
Emerging, CANADIAN PRESS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/reportsays-mercury-pcbs-still-threaten-arctic-new-chemicals-emerging-1.4134844
[https://perma.cc/KJ8J-8ZAC].
144 Id.
145 Id.
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now globally banned, pose serious threats. Some POPs are no
longer declining in response to use restrictions. By the 1990s,
human exposure to them had reached unhealthy levels.146
2. The Cultural and Socio- Economic Landscape147
The cultural and socio-economic landscape of the Arctic is
integral to any discussion of Arctic sustainability. While Arctic
people differ on more than what they have in common, some
individual and social characteristics are shared. Arctic communities
share spaces such as the Arctic Ocean, whose resources and services
they all benefit from and affect. Except for Iceland, each Arctic
country has been home to indigenous peoples for thousands of
years.148 Many of these people still live traditionally by hunting,
fishing, herding, and gathering plants for food.149 Crossing what are
now defined as country boundaries, or within them, are the Saami
in the circumpolar areas of Finland, Sweden, Norway, and
Northwest Russia; the Nenets, Khanty, Evenk, and Chukchi in
Russia, Aleut, Yupik, and Inuit (Inupiat) in Alaska; Inuit
(Inuvialuit) in Canada, and Inuit (Kalaallit) in Greenland—in all,
about forty ethnic groups.150 Tragically, the majority of the Arctic
shares a history of domination, abuse and disrespect of many native
peoples by majoritarian or colonizing peoples.
Indigenous peoples are increasingly involved in determining the
146 See Persistent Organic Pollutants, supra note 141 (implying the assertion in the
section titled “The DDT Dilemma”).
147 Greater detail about the characteristics of the region and its peoples, beyond what
can be included in this short summary geared to present the existing legal framework for
sustainability and to advocate the need for its further development, is found in a massive
literature on conditions of the Arctic and characteristics and demographics of its peoples;
elsewhere we have made efforts to incapsulate that information. See JOSEPH F. C.
DIMENTO, POLAR SHIFT: THE ARCTIC SUSTAINED (Anthem Press, forthcoming 2022).
148 See
Arctic Indigenous Peoples, U. LAPLAND ARCTIC CENTRE,
https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion/Arctic-Indigenous-Peoples
[https://perma.cc/2KHP-2CNJ] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) [hereinafter Arctic Indigenous
Peoples] (“Arctic indigenous peoples include for example Saami in circumpolar areas of
Finland, Sweden, Norway and Northwest Russia, Nenets, Khanty, Evenk and Chukchi in
Russia, Aleut, Yupik and Inuit (Iñupiat) in Alaska, Inuit (Inuvialuit) in Canada and Inuit
(Kalaallit) in Greenland. All of the above-mentioned countries except Iceland have
indigenous peoples living within their Arctic territory.”).
149 NORDIC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, ARCTIC SOCIAL INDICATORS: A FOLLOW-UP TO
THE ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 110 (Joan Nymand Larsen, Peter Schweitzer,
& Gail Fondahl eds., 2010) [hereinafter ARCTIC SOCIAL INDICATORS].
150 Arctic Indigenous Peoples, supra note 148.
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fate of the Arctic and defining sustainability. They do not think with
one mind, and they do not act in the same ways. Meanings and
indicators of environmental quality and sustainability differ among
Arctic people, including some indigenous peoples. Oil exploration
is as controversial inside as it is outside native communities. Oil
companies generate revenue, and this creates wealth; however, oil
drilling challenges subsistence life. Also, some native traditions are
threatened by environmentalists’ challenges, including to the fur
industry and interpretations of whaling law.151
In the Arctic region, common across boundaries are certain
social characteristics.152 Creating useful social indicators for the
Arctic peoples is not an easy task because of lack of information in
some sub areas, distinct views of what constitutes successful and
sustainable human development, and different ideas of which
groups should be compared.153
Some characteristics relevant to concerns about sustainability
nonetheless are evident. Incomes among Arctic people, generally
lower than for the overall population of the countries in which they
are situated, vary.154 For some sectors, immigrant labor dominates
and can command high wages; in places and sectors where the
policy is to pay whatever is necessary. However, for some
indigenous peoples there is considerable poverty and life can be
precarious. Also relevant is the nature of jobs and the economy in
parts of the Arctic. Boys in more rural areas have options available
because of their backgrounds in traditional work, such as herding
reindeer.
The life expectancy of Arctic peoples—those who live in the
Arctic parts of Arctic nations— from 2012 to 2016 was 74.7
years.155 The average for the Arctic countries themselves is about

See infra Section D with regard to seals hunting, including of the seal pup.
See Birger Poppel, Well-Being of Circumpolar Arctic Peoples: The Quest for
Continuity in THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN WELL-BEING 565–605 (2017). See generally
NORDIC COUNSIL OF MINISTERS, ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: REGIONAL
PROCESSES AND GLOBAL LINKAGES (Joan Nymand Larsen & Gail Fondahl eds., 2014)
(discussing the cultures and identities of Arctic peoples).
153 See ARCTIC SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 149, at 25.
154 Matthew Berman, Resource Rents, Universal Basic Income, and Poverty Among
Alaska’s Indigenous Peoples, 106 WORLD DEV. 161, 169–70 (2018). See generally Elena
N. Bogdanova et al., Demographic trends in Russian Arctic in the Context of Sustainable
Development, 39 REVISTA ESPACIOA 3 (2018).
155 Life
Expectancy in the Arctic, NORDREGIO (Mar. 19, 2019),
151
152
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82 years. Russia is an exception at about 73 years. Education levels
are high in the nations that make up the Arctic; however, that is not
the case for some of the Arctic parts of those countries. In remote
areas, many students do not complete upper secondary school and
there are self-reported functional difficulties at school, home, and in
leisure activities. Some of these difficulties are linked to mental
health problems.156
There are some shared patterns of mental health. Arctic regions
of the USA, Canada, and Russia have considerably higher suicide
rates than the non-Arctic regions of those countries.157 In Canada,
indigenous communities have rates higher than the general
Canadian population.158 For the Inuit, suicide rates rank among the
world’s highest. In one studied period (1999–2003), suicides in
Inuit regions averaged 135 per 100,000, which is more than ten
times that of Canada generally.159 The Inuit situation has gotten
considerably worse in recent years, due in major part to dramatic
increases of suicides by younger people.160 Suicide in some Arctic
regions is highest among teenagers, and young women are more
often its victim in Canada.161 These rates are not fully understood,
but they have been the subject of some social science research.
Suicide in the Arctic is linked to the loss of cultural continuity and
consumption of large quantities of alcohol.
In some Arctic places, primarily outside of the European Arctic,
the high price of food and the changes in diets of indigenous peoples
have made for food insecurity: people, especially children, do not

https://nordregio.org/maps/life-expectancy-in-the-arctic/ [https://perma.cc/Z77B-RLDV].
156 Elizabeth V. Bania et al., Non-completion of Upper Secondary School Among
Female and Male Young Adults in an Arctic Sociocultural Context: The NAAHS study, 16
BMC PUB. HEALTH 1, 8 (2016).
157 Eduardo Chachamovich et al., Suicide Among Inuit: Results From a Large,
Epidemiologically Representative Follow-Back Study in Nunavut, 60 CAN J. PSYCH. 268,
273-74 (2015). See Veronique Beaudoin et al., Protective Factors in the Inuit Population
of Nunavut: A Comparative Study of People Who Died by Suicide, People Who Attempted
Suicide, and People Who Never Attempted Suicide, 144 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. PUB. HEALTH
1, 1 (2018).
158 Chachamovich et al., supra note 157, at 273.
159 Id. at 269.
160 Id.
161 See generally Jason George, The Suicide Capital of the World, SLATE (Oct. 9,
2009,
9:39
AM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/10/why-do-so-manygreenlanders-kill-themselves.html [https://perma.cc/BJR4-VZHM].
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have adequate nutrition.162 For example, the costs of feeding a
family in Inuit Canada are much higher than a shopping cart of the
same foods in the southern part of the country, such as Ottawa.163
Climate change is a major factor in Arctic people’s lives. As
temperatures continue to rise, glaciers melt, the environment
changes, and economic sector development shifts with major
growth in some arenas. Tourism is increasing; depending on its
forms, it can bring economic goods and environmental recognition
or damage. Non-Arctic visitors are already the main source of
human presence in the Arctic: the region receives about 10.2 million
visits annually. Although many parts of the Arctic are not easily
accessible and traveling conditions can be extreme, tourism
continues to grow. Limited management of tourism makes for
environmental challenges: some are aesthetic, others can be more
significant. For example, harm occurs to culturally significant and
traditionally sacred places and demands on energy sources, which
then need to be expanded in vulnerable landscapes.
Tourists, investors, entrepreneurs, and businesses—both
established and new—matter both politically and as major
contributors to the Arctic economy. Where and how they invest,
how they travel, what they do in the Arctic, how they prioritize
sustaining traditions, cultures, and environmental quality will in
some part determine the future of the Arctic. Non-Arctic countries
and their industries are investing considerably in the region, but not
evenly. Some countries and regions are sought over others.164

162 Catherine Huet et al., Food Insecurity and Food Consumption by Season in
Households with Children in an Arctic City: A Cross-Sectional Study, 17 BMC PUB.
HEALTH 1, 11 (2017).
163 See Gigi Veeraraghavan et al., Paying For Nutrition A Report on Food Costing in
the North, FOOD SECURE CAN. 1, 4 (2016).
164 China has invested in a major way: billions of dollars in assets, cooperative
agreements, financing agreements, and particularly heavy investment in the energy and
minerals industry and infrastructure. China accounts for about half of the demand for
Canada’s minerals, buys significant amounts of timber, and has important mining
investments. China has also invested in Norway and the United States. In 2012, China
began investing in Greenland, which now receives almost 11% of the country’s GDP from
China. Among the investments are for a mine for rare earth elements and uranium.
Greenlanders generally welcome the contribution to the economy; however there have
been a few controversial investment attempts. In Iceland, the Chinese government has
invested $1.2 billion from 2012 to 2017, about 6% of the country’s average GDP. Ties
Dams et al., Presence Before Power: China’s Arctic Strategy in Iceland and Greenland,
CLINGENDAEL REP. NETH. INST. INT’L REL. 1, 34 (2020).
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Also shared in the Arctic is more accessible natural resource
exploitation. Not managed well, it has deleterious impacts on the
environment. However, it is also an economic engine, as the Arctic
is rich in natural resources. In 2003, natural resource exploitation
accounted for about 31% of Arctic GDP, including even higher
levels in Russian and North American areas and contributing 5–
10% of the work force in the European Arctic.165
About 25% of the world’s natural gas and 10% of oil are
produced in the Arctic.166 According to a 2008 estimate,
undiscovered or untapped resources could amount to ninety billion
barrels of oil, fifty trillion cubic meters of natural gas, and fortyfour billion barrels of natural gas liquids.167 Approximately 13% of
the world’s undiscovered technically recoverable oil and up to 30%
of its gas are estimated to be in the Arctic, with 84% offshore. 168
Most of the region’s oil reserves are in Alaska, whereas natural gas
is more concentrated in Russia’s seas. Exploitation in the seas
remains a new frontier, but onshore oil and gas have been produced
for decades. Of great interest to the future of Arctic sustainability
are planned activities of oil exploration and possible exploitation.

In the Russian Arctic, state-backed firms have dominated development of energy.
However, industry analysts expect Western petroleum companies to provide needed
technology and management expertise, as demonstrated by the partnership of ExxonMobil
and Rosneft, a very large global public oil and gas company. In 2020, the Russian
government created $300 billion in new incentives for ports, factories, and oil and gas
developments on the shores and in the waters of the Arctic Ocean. These investments are
to double maritime traffic in the Northern Sea Route and to give a boost to energy
companies. As part of the program, Russia’s government is offering tax breaks for
offshore oil and gas developments. John Last, What Russia’s $300B Investment in Arctic
Oil and Gas Means for Canada, EYE ON THE ARCTIC, (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2020/02/17/what-russias-300b-investment-inarctic-oil-and-gas-means-for-canada/ [https://perma.cc/8M82-FK57].
165 Gerard Duhaime & Andree Caron, The Economy of the Circumpolar Arctic,
ECONOMY N. STATISTICS NORWAY 17, 18 (2006).
166 Arnfinn Jørgensen-Dahl, Artic Oil and Gas, ARCTIC KNOWLEDGE HUB (2010),
http://www.arctis-search.com/Arctic+Oil+and+Gas [https://perma.cc/9EY2-BHZB].
167 Kenneth J. Bird et al., Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of
Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, U.S. GEO. SURVEY (2008). There are
47.2 trillion cubic meters in 1669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. HOOMAN PEIMANI,
ENERGY SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE ARTIC 109 (2013).
168 Huge Amount of Fossil Fuels in Arctic: 90 Billion Barrels Of Oil And 1,670
Trillion Cubic Feet Of Natural Gas, SCIENCEDAILY (July 24, 2008),
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/07/080724115043.htm
[https://perma.cc/5YZK-5ET8].
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Similar questions are raised for some mining projects.
Fish have a central place throughout Arctic economies.
Fisheries represent about 90% of the export earnings of Greenland,
33% in Iceland, and about 6% in Norway. In Russia and the United
States, which have more diversified and larger economies, fish sales
are about 1% of export earnings. Global warming will create
conditions for the arrival of new fish species.
Both the similarities and differences—whether individual,
group, or societal—among peoples in the Arctic influence the
prioritization of elements of sustainability. Most, if not all, will
agree that climate change needs to be addressed. That agreement
will be less likely when determining how to address the challenges.
Similarly, not all people in Arctic zones, Arctic nations, and outside
regions more generally will agree on whether resources extraction
or wildlife management, for example, enhance Arctic sustainability
or threaten it.
D. The Law
The volume of Arctic sustainability law is vast. In this section,
we lay out the most important components of the law and
summarize views on its effectiveness. We do so with perspectives
of the classical environmental goals of protection of the physical
environmental and pollution control, and with the goal of cultural
sustainability.
The rules come from many sources, such as general
international law and treaties with a direct focus on the Arctic, or
with great relevance to the Arctic environment.169 Customary
international law and general principles are applicable to any region.
Rules also include the Arctic nations’ own federal or national laws
and sub-national laws within the Arctic countries, like those of
provinces, states, territories, municipalities, and cities. The laws,
rules, and practices of indigenous, aboriginal, or native peoples not
linked to any country’s law-making institutions are also included in
our accounting. There are also important rules that cover a region
169 Here rules encompass the wide range of formal, even if not written, social actions
addressed at protection of the Arctic. This is similar to the definition in the World Ocean
Assessment of the United Nations but in a more encompassing way. Inniss & Simcock,
supra note 12, Part I, at 4 (“[T]he social rules that have developed to control human
activities—including national legislation, the law of the sea, international agreements on
particular human uses of the sea and broader international agreements that apply to both
land and sea.”).
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or a part of the Arctic, such as the marine environment of the
Northeast Atlantic or an agreement among some Arctic countries on
the protection of a particular fish species or mammal.
However, these laws represent the tip of the iceberg.
Agreements, with many different names, number in the hundreds.
They include memoranda of understanding (agreements that give
the terms of a commitment among parties) and diplomatic letters
between or among nations or local governments and indigenous
peoples in the Arctic. We also include influential sources such as
customary international law and the opinions and decisions of
courts or other tribunals. Other sources of soft law that are
influential in the Arctic are the declarations and principles made at
international meetings, such as those of the United Nations General
Assembly, conferences, and as preliminary statements to later
legally binding agreements. Also important are local agreements
between or among tribes, governments, and businesses.
The overall combination of components is like a Russian doll.
The layers influence, touch on, and cover a region that is not a
legally defined place: the Arctic. One summary of rules that target
the environment of some or all of the Arctic countries fills 350
pages,170 and that does not include separate sections on the Law of
the Sea, Fisheries, Indigenous Peoples, and Shipping, among other
topics, in a tome that numbers 1,484 pages.
A focus on conditions of human beings, the poor, and the
indigenous leads to a broad investigation of additional rules. Rules
govern both the physical environment, the cultural and human
environment, sustainability, and human rights. The rules cover
health effects on people and wildlife, in addition to, and sometimes
in tension with, effects on the atmosphere, the water, and the land.
What to include here is not a matter of consensus among
academics, policymakers and stakeholders. However, for our
purposes, conclusions are necessary if wise decisions are to be made
about what, if any, new rules are necessary. We conclude that the
results of decades of Arctic rulemaking have been good but have
not yet provided sufficient protection. Therefore, in the next
section, we analyze leading candidates for new legal initiatives for
the Arctic.
170 See e.g., KRISTINA SCHÖNFELDT, THE ARCTIC IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
(2017). See also Arctic Policy & Law: References to Selected Documents, THE INT’L
COUNCIL OF ENV’T L. (2011).
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Attempting to present the law on the environmental quality of
the Arctic and its sustainability risks being overinclusive or
underinclusive in instruments included and short on specifics or
much too long on detail of each. Nonetheless, there are several
major agreed upon components. It is visually useful to lay out some
of the inventory of environmental rules that apply to the Arctic—as
in Table A. These are important because all or most Arctic countries
have formally committed to complying with them.171
Table A: International Laws that Apply to the Arctic – By
Media Type
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171 See International Agreements, ARCTIC PORTAL, https://arcticportal.org/arcticgovernance/international-agreements [https://perma.cc/NA34-D82H] (last visited Nov. 4,
2021).
172 See Convention on Fishing and Conservations of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (listing arctic countries as signing parties).
173 See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, May 5, 1992, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 (listing arctic countries as
signing parties).
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174 See The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, GA 164/37 (Sept. 8, 1995).
175 See U.N. Director-General of the United Nations Educational Scientific, and
Cultural Organization, Protocol to amend the Convention of 2 February 1971 on wetlands
of international importance especially as waterfowl habitat, 1437 U.N.T.S. 3 (Oct. 1,
1986) (listing arctic countries as signing parties).
176 See Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, CMS,
https://www.cms.int/en/parties-range-states [https://perma.cc/PX8W-F7Y7] (last visited
Nov. 4, 2021) (listing arctic countries as signing parties).
177 See Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and
other matter, Aug. 30, 1975, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 (listing arctic countries as signing parties).
178 See Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Oct. 30, 2001, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (listing
arctic countries as signing parties).
180 See Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (listing arctic countries as signing parties).
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1. UNCLOS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”),183 the “constitution” for the seas, is central to the
way the world protects or fails to protect the Arctic. UNCLOS
governs activities of the 168 parties that have ratified it, including
all of the Arctic states except the United States. The United States
follows the main provisions of UNCLOS as customary international
law.
UNCLOS “zones” the oceans. Nations have agreed to create
179 See Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats,
Sept. 19, 1979 (listing arctic countries as signing parties).
181 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 136.
182 See Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Mar. 17, 1992,
2105 U.N.T.S. 457 (listing arctic countries as signing parties).
183 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].

2022

ARCTIC SUSTAINABILITY LAW

281

demarcations of the waters, regulating what can be done and by
which countries within each of these limited areas. Varying
amounts of sovereignty exist in the zones, areas which extend from
the internal waters to the high seas.
As one moves away from a country’s shoreline, the degree of
authority or control that a country has decreases to zero (see Figure
1).
Figure 1:184

In the internal waters, states have complete sovereignty except
for limitations created by other treaties or obligations existing under
customary international law.185 Therefore, because activities on
land and in waters that flow to the Arctic affect the Arctic
environment, the strength of an individual country’s environmental
protection law of its own waters is crucial to overall Arctic
environmental quality. Most Arctic nations have strong national
environmental laws with good enforcement and records of
compliance.186
184 Carlson et al., Scramble for the Arctic: Layered Sovereignty, UNCLOS, and
Competing Maritime Territorial Claims, 33 SAIS REV. 21, 24 (2013).
185 UNCLOS, supra note 183, at Part II, § 1, art. 2(3).
186 There is some variability depending on the category of protection, such as for
biodiversity, conservation of natural resources, and control of black carbon. This is a strong
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The Territorial Seas, where ships have rights of innocent
passage and transit passage,187 extend twelve nautical miles,
measured from “baselines” determined by the Treaty.188 Here, the
coastal states act to conserve living resources in the zone. These
states have authority to prevent violations of their fishing rules and
to, generally, preserve the environment and control pollution in that
part of the sea.189 Most Arctic nations have highly developed
management systems in this area although there are gaps.190
The Territorial Seas are followed by the Contiguous Zones,
extending twelve to twenty-four nautical miles from the baseline.
In this zone, the coastal state can regulate many activities, including
management of wastes.191 The UNCLOS language includes
“prevent[ing] infringement of its . . . sanitary laws.”192
Beyond these areas are the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and
the Continental Shelf. The EEZ, generally extending over the same
space as the Continental Shelf, governs the resources and activities
in the water and on the ocean surface. It can extend up to two
hundred nautical miles from the shore. Here, the coastal nation has
authority to conserve and manage natural resources, both living and
non-living, and to protect the marine environment.193 The coastal
states can exploit or conserve resources found within the water, on
the sea floor, or under the sea floor’s subsoil. 194 These resources
include fish, oil, and natural gas. Land-locked and geographically
disadvantaged states can take some of the surplus of the living
resources of this zone of the coastal states in their region.195 Coastal
states may manage treatment of marine mammals more strictly than
the requirements noted in the Treaty.196
contributor to climate change formed when combustion of fuels and organic material is
incomplete.
187 UNCLOS, supra note 183, at Part II § 3 art. 17, 37.
188 Id. at Part II, § 2, art. 3. They may be straight lines or other forms depending on
the nature of a country’s shoreline, its islands, and reefs. Id.
189 Id. at Part II, § 3, art. 21.
190 See id.
191 See UNCLOS, supra note 183, at Part II, § 4, art. 33(1)(a).
192 Id.
193 Id. at Part V, art. 56(1)(a).
194 Id.
195 Id. at Part V, art. 69.
196 Id. at Part V, art. 65 (“Nothing in this Part restricts the rights of a coastal state . . .
to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than
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The Continental Shelf extends along the natural prolongation of
a country’s land to the outer edge of the continental margin, which
is two hundred miles or more in some circumstances. Here, the
coastal states have the right to explore and exploit the non-living
natural resources, sedentary species, and activities of the seabed,
and subsoil under the ocean.197 Oysters, clams, and mussels are
among the sedentary species: those of “constant physical contact
with the seabed.”198 Countries have fought over whether crabs and
lobsters are included.199
Because the extent of the Continental Shelf for Arctic nations
remains an unsettled matter, the rules which govern beyond two
hundred miles are not fully determined. The process for
demarcating the zone involves recommendations made by the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. As of mid2021, several Arctic state petitions are before the Commission and
their substantive requests cannot all be met.200 The Commission
does not decide; rather it analyzes and judges the science presented
by the petitioning state.201 This situation leaves uncertain which
rules will apply to some of the sea bottom and resources below it in
the Arctic, as explained further below.
Rules under The Law of the Sea direct countries to cooperate
and protect those fish which come and go in their waters.202

provided for in this Part.”); see id. at Part VII, §1, art. 117 (“All States have the duty to
take, or to cooperate with other States in taking, such measures for their respective
nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high
seas.”).
197 See id. at Part VI, art. 77(1), (4).
198 Id. at Part VI, art. 77(4); see Bivalves, WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA (2021),
http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/Bi-Ca/Bivalves.html
[https://perma.cc/KF67MTX2].
199 Joanna Mossop, The Relationship Between the Continental Shelf Regime and a
New International Instrument for Protecting Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction, ICES J. MARINE SCI. 444, 445 (2017).
200 See infra text accompanying note 366 (discussing strict no-take zones when it
comes to the goal of protecting and restoring marine biodiversity).
201 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Purpose, functions and
sessions,
U.N.
DIV.
OCEAN
AFF.
L.
SEA,
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm
[https://perma.cc/5Z2Z-BGVC] (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
202 UNCLOS, supra note 183, at Part V, art. 63 (“Stocks occurring within the
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive
economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to it. ”); See id. at Part V, art. 64
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Migratory species, fish that cross zones, are given special
protection.203 UNCLOS recognizes that coastal states are limited in
what they can do to protect these moving animals. It defines which
fish fall into this category, including tunas, sharks, swordfish, and
billfish.204 The treaty instructs nations to work together to develop
programs to limit the excessive take of these species. Marine
mammals are also given special consideration.
2. High Seas
“Specifying the high seas as the object of the inquiry requires a
caveat. . . . UNCLOS deliberately does not contain a geographic
definition of the high seas.”205 The high seas legal regime coexists
with the legal regime of the continental shelf.
The High Seas are the waters beyond the UNCLOS zones.206
There, coastal state jurisdiction ends. In the Arctic Ocean, there are
about 1.1 million square miles (around 2 .85 million square
kilometers) of “areas beyond national jurisdiction” (“ABNJ”),
sometimes known as the “Arctic donut hole.”207 The UNCLOS
provisions on the High Seas apply to all parts of the sea that are not
included in the EEZ, in the territorial sea, in the internal waters of a
State, or in the archipelagic water of an archipelagic state.208
The Central Arctic Ocean (“CAO”) is the largest area of high
seas in the Arctic. It is surrounded entirely by the EEZs of Canada,
the Kingdom of Denmark (namely, Greenland and the Faroe
Islands), Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States,
and spans an area of approximately 2.8 million square kilometers
(1.1 million square miles)—virtually the same size as the
Mediterranean Sea.209
(addressing highly migratory species).
203 See UNCLOS, supra note 183, at Part V, art. 64.
204 Id. at Annex I.
205 Bernard H. Oxman, High Seas Governance: Gaps and Challenges, 114 AM. J.
INT’L L. 796, 797 (2020).
206 UNCLOS, supra note 183, at Part VII.
207 Mia Bennett, The Donut Hole at the Center of the Arctic Ocean, CRYOPOLITICS
(June 23, 2015), https://www.cryopolitics.com/2015/06/23/the-donut-hole-at-the-centerof-the-arctic-ocean/ [https://perma.cc/3DKZ-M2D7].
208 UNCLOS, supra note 183, at Part VII, § 1.
209 Exploring the Arctic Ocean: The Agreement that Protects an Unknown Ecosystem,
ARCTIC COUNCIL (Oct. 28, 2020), https://arctic-council.org/en/news/exploring-the-arcticocean-the-agreement-that-protects-an-unknown-
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No law is in place that all nations agree controls in these
important areas. But some international rules do cover these places.
For fishing, for example, cooperative agreements exist, such as the
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries of the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.210 Further,
regional organizations have been established to regulate fishing in
the high seas. They set quotas for the number of fish that can be
caught, then divide this “total allowable catch” among states.211
Arctic nations are members of a number of regional fisheries’
management organizations.212
No matter what decisions are made on the extent of the outer

ecosystem/#:~:text=To%20bring%20the%20area%20into,and%20the%20United%20Stat
es%2C%20and [https://perma.cc/F2CU-WFWS].
210 See Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N.,
https://www.fao.org/fishery/code/en [https://perma.cc/3697-Q22U] (last visited Oct. 26,
2021).
211 UNCLOS, supra note 183, at Art. 4.
212 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO) in the area are the North
Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and the North East Atlantic Fisheries
Commission (NEAFC). There are also other national and intergovernmental organizations
that manage commercial stocks of the Arctic. Roland Blomeyer et al., Fisheries
Management and the Arctic in the Context of Climate Change, EUR. PARLIAMENT
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INT’L POLICIES 1, 15 (2015).
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reaches of the continental shelves213 of Arctic countries,214 up to
two million square kilometers (777,200 square miles) of the Arctic
will still not be covered because they are beyond the sovereign
powers of nation states under UNCLOS zones.215 The surface of the
213 UNCLOS Article 76 defines the continental shelf as “compris[ing] the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.”
3. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass
of the coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope
and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the
subsoil thereof.
4.
(a) For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer
edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,
by either:
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost
fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least
1 per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental
slope; or
(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points
not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope.
(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope
shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base.
5. The fixed points comprising the line of the continental shelf on the seabed,
drawn in accordance with paragraph 4 (a)(i) and (ii), either shall not exceed
350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath,
which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine ridges, the outer
limit of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This paragraph
does not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components of the
continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs.
UNCLOS, supra note 183, art. 76.
214 As of 2018, Arctic nations have not yet established jurisdiction over areas beyond
their Exclusive Economic Zones. Overlapping claims include Canada and Denmark;
Canada and the United States; Denmark and Norway; Denmark and Russia; Norway and
Russia; Russia and the United States; and Canada, Denmark and Russia. Stephanie Pezard
et al., The Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Environment, RAND
CORP. 1, 3 (2018).
215 The area is about 2.8 million square kilometers in the case of the water column
and is less in the case of the seabed. See Stewart M. Patrick, Why the U.N. Pact on High
Seas Biodiversity Is Too Important to Fail, WORLD POLITICS REV. (July 8, 2019),
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28011/why-the-u-n-pact-on-high-seasbiodiversity-is-too-important-to-fail [https://perma.cc/V9UR-3TXN].
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sea, the water below it, and the bed of the sea make up a significant
area in need of more attention to their environments. These include
places of historically unprecedented fisheries collapse such as of the
pollock in the 1980s.216 The area is environmentally important
because of its fisheries, mineral resources, and biodiversity. There
is a need for much greater knowledge in the Arctic concerning all
of these areas.
a. Some Fisheries’ Rules
The global legal regime for high seas fisheries does apply to the
CAO. The rules provided by the law of the sea are the 1982
UNCLOS, the 1995 U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement,217 the 1995 Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,218 and a number of U.N.
General Assembly Resolutions.219 Now also in effect is the Central
Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement.220 In 2018, the five Arctic
Ocean coastal states (Canada, Denmark [on behalf of Greenland and
the Faroe Islands], Norway, Russia, and the United States – the
‘Arctic Five’) and China, the European Union (EU), Iceland, Japan,
and South Korea signed the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated
High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAOFA).221 The
objective of the CAOFA is to prevent unregulated fishing in the
high seas portion of the CAO “through the application of
precautionary conservation and management measures as part of a
long-term strategy to safeguard healthy marine ecosystems and to
ensure the conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks.”222
216 Kevin M. Bailey, An Empty Donut Hole: The Great Collapse of a North American
Fishery, 16 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 28 (2011).
217 U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
Agreement For The Implementation of The Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37,
(Sept. 8, 1995).
218 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, supra note 210.
219 Valentin Schatz, Alexander Proelss & Nengye Liu, The 2018 Agreement to
Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean: A Primer, EJIL
(Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-2018-agreement-to-prevent-unregulatedhigh-seas-fisheries-in-the-central-arctic-ocean-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/CC7L-X795].
220 Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean,
GOV’T OF CANADA (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/agreementaccord-eng.htm [https://perma.cc/AY3D-WFUZ] [hereinafter CAOFA].
221 Id.
222 Valentin Schatz et al., The 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas
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Prior to the CAOFA, the CAO had not been part of a
comprehensive regional fisheries agreement, although a bit of the
CAO does fall within the area of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries
Commission. Other regional fisheries management organizations
(RFMOs) and arrangements (RFMAs) do not provide a mandate for
comprehensive fisheries regulation in the CAO. The Svalbard
Treaty, although the meaning of which on access to certain
resources is not agreed upon, also addresses sharing of fishing rights
in parts of the Arctic.223
The CAOFA covers species of fish, mollusks, and crustaceans,
but not sedentary species, as defined by UNCLOS (which are
covered in the continental shelf law under UNCLOS).224 The
CAOFA has a sunset clause and will be automatically renewed
unless one of the parties objects.225 Underscoring the view of
sustainability as embracing cultural traditions, the CAOFA is an
example of integration of principles of the U.N. Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in international law-making.226
b. Other Resources Beyond National Jurisdiction
More comprehensive resource coverage is lacking in the Arctic
High Seas. However, many countries are now actively negotiating
a global treaty on marine biodiversity in this area.227 The treaty
would promote the “conservation and sustainable use” of marine
resources and living organisms in the high seas, an expanse
encompassing fifty percent of the planet’s surface and all the water
below.228 These riches can belong to anyone, everyone, or no one,
depending on what rules are made. These areas are home to deepsea coral fields. They are also a place where carbon is stored
through phytoplankton, fisheries abound, and yet-to-be-discovered
Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean: A Critical Analysis, 34 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL
L. 195, 222 (2019).
223 The wording of the CAO agreement was aimed to avoid conclusions on the status
of waters around Svalbard (or Spitsbergen) where Norway has fisheries jurisdiction, but
other nations have rights to engage in, inter alia, fishing. Id.
224 UNCLOS, supra note 183, art. 77(4).
225 CAOFA, supra note 220, art. 13(2).
226 G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(Oct. 2, 2007).
227 Vito De Lucia, The BBNJ Negotiations and Ecosystem Governance In The Arctic,
MARINE POL’Y 1, 1-2 (2019).
228 Id.

2022

ARCTIC SUSTAINABILITY LAW

289

genetic resources exist (i.e., valuable material from plants, animals,
and microbes that need to be sustained to maintain the complexity
of life and which also can be used for human products). 229 The
treaty would create special areas of high seas marine protection,
develop a means of sharing benefits from the resources, and require
environmental studies before actions are taken. As of 2020, the
United Nations’ negotiations on the treaty were postponed until
2021 because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Among the uncertainties related to which law applies are
unknowns about the determinations of the continental shelf
boundary demarcations and the future decisions of affected Arctic
states after those are made.
Mining is guided in part by the concept of the common heritage
of mankind. It holds that certain riches that are found in the seas
are owned by mankind as a whole and should be shared in ways that
benefit not only the rich but also poorer nations. UNCLOS created
the International Seabed Authority (ISA), based in Jamaica, to
manage the eventual exploitation of High Seas seabed.230 Its
activities reflect a compromise among nations that advocated a
sharing of resources and those—most vociferously the United
States—that strongly opposed it. ISA nonetheless reflects the
general idea of common heritage in its work. It has a double
function: develop deep-sea minerals and protect the environment.
The ISA creates policies for the seabed and contracts with private
and public corporations to explore and later mine areas of the deep
seabed. The area covers around 54% of the total area of the world’s
oceans.231 All state parties to UNCLOS are members of ISA. Thus,
all Arctic states, except the United States, are members.232 The ISA
has made some efforts for environmental protection such as in
requiring environmental assessments of activities done in the
Area.233
The Law of the Sea also has general environmental protection
parts.234 The countries of the world must work, individually or
Id.
About
ISA, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/about-isa
[https://perma.cc/J4K9-98QG] (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 UNCLOS, supra note 183, art. 145.
234 Id.
229
230
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together, to control pollution from ships, activities on land, the
exploitation of the seabed, and dumping. Countries also need to
protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems and the habitat of
endangered and other marine life. The treaty requires the use of the
“best practicable means” available to achieve these goals.235
Under UNCLOS, the coastal states in the Arctic have additional
powers in ice-covered areas. One section applies to areas of ice
coverage for most of the year.236 This may allow coastal states
broader powers to set rules for ship construction and other activities
on vessels in their waters.
3. Interpreting the Rules
The Law of the Sea provides a variety of means to resolve legal
questions. For boundary questions, the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf makes recommendations to states on the
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond two
hundred nautical miles.237 In the Arctic, the five Arctic coastal states
have or soon will have submitted Commission recommendations on
the outer limits of the continental shelf.238 As of late 2020, the
Commission was still considering submissions made by the Russian
Federation for the Arctic Ocean (following up on an earlier
submission).239 What happens if these disputes are left unresolved
is unknown. Also unclear are next steps if the Commission’s
decisions are rejected. Rulings may not be binding under customary
international law.240 Thus, there is some concern that the
Commission’s results will not lead to formal resolution of
competing claims of Arctic states.241

UNCLOS supra note 183, § XII, art. 194.
UNCLOS, supra note 183, § VII, art. 234.
237 Id.
238 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Purpose, Functions
and
Sessions,
U.N.
DIV.
OCEAN
AFF.
L.
SEA,
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm
[https://perma.cc/RW8C-MEH3] (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
239 Id.
240 See Press Release, Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Commission
on Limits of Continental Shelf Concludes Fifty-First Session, U.N. Press Release
SEA/2120 (Dec. 2, 2019).
241 See Terence Andrew, Jr., Finding the Right Forum: The Need for Novel
Multilateral Diplomatic Solutions to Resolve Competing Territorial Claims Over the
Arctic’s Natural Resource (Oct. 31, 2013).
235
236
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Under UNCLOS and other laws relevant to the Arctic dispute,
resolution mechanisms available include negotiations and voluntary
negotiations, arbitration of a number of kinds, a special arbitral
tribunal for specified categories of disputes including over fisheries
and other environmental matters, and the International Court of
Justice.
4. Law Beyond the Law of the Sea
There are numerous other sources of environmental rules for the
Arctic. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is legally
influential through treaties and “soft law.”242 In 2017, its Polar
Code, which is more stringent than requirements imposed by other
marine international law, entered into force. It is binding under the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL).243 It covers the full range of shipping relevant
to navigation in polar water. It bans discharges of oil residues from
ships traveling in the polar regions.244 One part covers safety,245
while a second covers pollution prevention.246 The Code prohibits
discharges of chemicals used to clean ships and tanks.247 It requires
that food waste that is generated on polar going ships be ground and
disposed several miles away from land or the nearest ice
formation.248
Some rules do not include all states, all Arctic states, or all
peoples of the Arctic.249 Bilateral agreements include the 1983
242 See Mark P. Nevitt & Robert V. Percival, Polar Opposites: Assessing the State of
Environmental Law in the World’s Polar Regions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2018).
242 Introduction to IMO, INT’L MARITIME ORG., https://www.imo.org/en/About
/Pages/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/GHS4-Q7R2] (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
243 MARPOL itself was amended in 2010. Regulation 43 prohibits carrying fuels of
a prescribed densities at given temperatures. Table of MARPOL amendments,
AUSTRALIAN MARITIME SAFETY AUTHORITY, https://www.amsa.gov.au/marineenvironment/marine-pollution/table-marpol-amendments [https://perma.cc/FA57-8MAN]
(last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
244 International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), INT’L MAR.
AUTH., https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Pages/polar-code.aspx [https://perma.cc
/8ZCP-EXVD] (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
245 Id.
246 Id. pt. II-A.
247 Id. pt. II-A, ¶ 5.2.1.
248 See id.
249 See e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, opened for signature
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Canada-Denmark Agreement, in which the two nations agreed to
cooperate and protect the marine environment within their areas of
responsibility.250 Regional groups also create rules and norms for
the Arctic. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council of the five Nordic
states, the European Union Commission, and Russia (BEAR) is a
platform for promotion of sustainable economic and social
development in the Barents Region.251 The Barents Regional
Council (BRC), constituted by seven subnational governments,
provincial, county and oblast, and the Saami Council is another
cooperation protocol.252 Indigenous peoples have advisory roles in
both organizations.253
Many domestic laws have an Arctic reach.254 Some of these
address substantive rights of indigenous people, and others address
participation in decision making.255 Both types play an important
function in promoting notions of sustainability that include
indigenous peoples.256

May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
250 Agreement for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment, Den.-Can., Aug.
26, 1983, 1348 U.N.T.S. 122.
251 Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Declaration: Cooperation in the Barents EuroArctic Region Conference of Foreign Ministers in Kirkenes, (Jan. 11, 1993)
https://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/459_doc_KirkenesDeclaration.pdf.
See
also
Copperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, BARENTS EURO-ARCTIC COUNCIL,
https://www.barentscooperation.org/en [https://perma.cc/Y9ZP-TB34].
252 See Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Protocol Agreement from the Statutory Meeting
of the Regional Council of the Barents Region (The Euro-Arctic Region) (Jan. 11, 1993)
(outlining the BEAR agreement terms) [hereinafter BEAR Protocol]. See also SAAMI
COUNCIL, THE SÁMI ARTIC STRATEGY 4 (2019).
253 See BEAR Protocol, supra note 252, at 2 (“[The] Regional Council of the Barents
Euro-Arctic Region [] will include . . . [the] representation of the indigenous peoples of
the Region.”).
254 Nevitt & Percival, supra note 242, at 1687 (describing the limited effectiveness of
Arctic law due to the varying legal status of indigenous peoples in domestic law).
255 See id.
256 See Robert T. Anderson, The Katie John Litigation: A Continuing Search for
Alaska Native Fishing Rights After the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 51
ARIZ. STATE L.J. 845, 857–58 (2019) (“ANCSA’s affirmative elimination of aboriginal
hunting and fishing rights has had devastating effects on Native subsistence uses and has
made it extremely difficult for Native tribes to have a role in co-management of subsistence
resources.”). See also CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS [CONSTITUTION], §
25, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11,
§ 25 (U.K.) (providing for indigenous rights and requirements of consulting with
indigenous peoples.).
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a. Ozone depletion
The Arctic has a central place in the story of the ozone hole. A
number of rules control and eventually ban worldwide the
production and use of chemicals that weaken the ozone layer, a
protective layer of the earth’s atmosphere within the stratosphere.
These are the original Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer and instruments culminating in the sixth Amendment
(Kigali) to the Montreal Protocol in 2016 (The Ozone Regime).257
The substances, now in the aggregate called ozone depleting
substance, were ubiquitous after World War II when they came to
be used in air conditioners, spray cans, refrigerators, and many other
consumer products.258 They were considered benign with no toxic
effects until the chemical reaction which led to creation of the ozone
hole was discovered.259 Rapidly for a world response, a system of
legal controls on these chemicals, beginning with
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), was adopted. Starting in 1976, an
initiative began with United Nations actions—at first modest
because the full effects of the chemical reaction and its effects on
humans (cataracts, skin cancers, etc.) and nature (destruction of
phytoplankton, for example) were not fully appreciated.260 Quickly,
however, science established that these effects were becoming
increasingly alarming, and the nations of the world developed an
elegant treaty group.261 The Ozone Regime does not target only the
Arctic itself, but, as with the Antarctic, it is a direct beneficiary of
the rules.262 The hole over the poles should be metaphorically
closed within several decades if the nations of the world continue to
comply with the rules.263 However, there will be years when the
Arctic ozone layer oscillates, and global climate change will counter
some of the positive results, as ozone-depleting substances account
Montreal Protocol, supra note 136.
JAMES W. ELKINS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 78–80 (David E.
Alexander & Rhodes W. Fairbridge eds., 1999).
259 See id.
260 Peter M. Morrisette, The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone
Depletion, 29 NAT. RES. J. 793 (1989).
261 Id.
262 See ELKINS, supra note 258, at 78-80 (noting that ozone loss was enhanced in Polar
regions by CFC pollution).
263 See Guus J. M. Velders et al., The Importance of the Montreal Protocol in
Protecting Climate, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 4814, 4814 (2007) (noting the impact
of the Montreal Protocol on the reduction of ozone layer loss.).
257
258
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for about half of the global warming in the Arctic.264
b. Species protection
A complex web of national and international rules exists to
protect endangered or threatened species, some iconic or lovable (at
least from a distance) in the Arctic, as for the world.
A main global treaty is the Convention on the International
Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna, generally called
CITES.265 CITES controls the trade in selected plants and animals,
subjecting them to regulation of import, export, and re-export (and
introduction from the sea).266 The nature of the requirements
depends on the seriousness of the challenge to extinction that a
species confronts; different levels of vulnerability are published in
appendices.267 Among the species found in the Arctic with varying
degrees of protection are whales (the fin, the bowhead, the sperm,
the humpbacked, the Minke, the killer and the Beluga), the whitetailed eagle, the Polar bear, and the walrus.268 Arctic species of
particular popularity that are not affected are seal, reindeer, and
musk oxen.269
Other treaties that govern in the Arctic through membership by
Arctic states are the Convention on Biological Diversity,270 the
Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals,271 the International Convention of the Regulation of
Whaling,272 the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention
on Biological Diversity,273 the Nagoya Protocol on Access to
See id. at 4817 (discussing the varying ozone layer levels throughout the years).
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
266 See id. art. III.
267 See id. art. II (noting that different appendices apply based on their extinction
status).
268 See Summary of CITES Appendices I, II and III, CONVENTION ON INT’L TRADE IN
ENDANGERED SPECIES (2021) (providing a list of all species under CITES protections).
269 Id.
270 Convention on Biological Diversity, Jun. 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
271 Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Jun. 23, 1979,
1651 U.N.T.S. 4.
272 International Convention of the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161
U.N.T.S. 72.
273 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan.
29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208.
264
265
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Genetic Resources, and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits
Arising from Their Utilization.274
The tensions between some notions of environmental protection
and cultural protection are reflected in a hard-fought case in the
Arctic involving seal hunting (including seal pups).275 Rules under
the World Trade Organization law were at issue. Supporters of
annual seal hunts say they provide important income for fishery
workers and that the hunts are important parts of traditional cultural
practices.276 Animal rights activists and some environmentalists
oppose the hunts in part because of the means used to kill the
animals and the age of some of the seals killed.277 Rules aimed to
stop the hunts have been adopted in many places, and among the
most important were in the European Union (EU).278 Its Seal
Regime bans the sale of seal products in all EU member states, with
a few exceptions including for products from hunts by indigenous
peoples.279 The ban specifically targets commercial sealing
operations, such as those in two Arctic nations, Canada and
Norway.280 The two nations complained in a case brought before
the World Trade Organization (WTO).281
A lower court or panel of the WTO found that the EU’s ban on
imported seal products is justified under a section of trade rules
involving protection of public morals, here specifically on the
grounds of animal welfare.282 However, the ban was discriminatory
in the way it is applied; it needed to be changed to comply with
global trade rules.283 The EU had not made comparable efforts to

274 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources, and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization, Convention on Biological Diversity
(Oct. 29, 2010).
275 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R,
WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014).
276 See, e.g., id. ¶ 2.56.
277 See, e.g., id. ¶ 2.131.
278 Id. ¶ 1.2.
279 Id.
280 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R,
WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014).
281 Id.
282 Id. ¶ 5.139.
283 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the
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facilitate access of the Canadian Inuit to the exception to the hunting
ban as it did for the Greenlandic Inuit. WTO rejected an appeal by
Canada and Norway, setting a precedent that animal welfare can
prevail over the right to trade.284
The dispute was one of the most polarizing and complex in
WTO history and marked the first time that the WTO body accepted
animal welfare as moral grounds for justifying a country’s violation
of the global trade body’s “most favored nation” principle.285
The Arctic program is a “partner program” in the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) Regional Seas Programme
(RSP).286 “Partner” means the connection of the sea or region to the
United Nations is less formal than for others, such as for the
Mediterranean—one of the oldest and most active programs.287
There are calls for formalizing and strengthening the program in the
Arctic to move in the direction of making rules, which is discussed
in the next Section.288
c. The Arctic Council-cooperation and influencing rules
Initiatives that influence the quality of the Arctic’s social and
physical environment do not only include specific rules. An
organization that is playing a central place in the Arctic world and
beyond is the Arctic Council. The Council is a forum that promotes
cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic nations
and the Arctic peoples (native and others).289
In 1991, Finland convened a conference in Rovaniemi of the
eight Arctic states. There they signed the Rovaniemi Declaration,290
adopting the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, a
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R,
WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014).
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Regional Seas Programme, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, https://www.unep.org
/explore-topics/oceans-seas/what-we-do/regional-seas-programme
[https://perma.cc
/A89N-8366] (describing the various conventions established for sea regions).
287 Id. (mentioning the various types of agreements between members).
288 Id.; see infra Section E.4 (noting the recommendation for the Arctic’s future
involvement with the Regional Seas Programme).
289 Arctic Council, Declaration on The Establishment of The Arctic Council, art. 1,
(Sept. 19, 1996) [hereinafter Ottawa Declaration].
290 Arctic Council, Declaration on The Protection of Arctic Environment, Jun. 14,
1991.
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nonbinding agreement among the Arctic nations. In a rare outcome
for international institutions, some indigenous peoples of the Arctic
were also represented through the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat.
It is composed of three Permanent Participants: the SAAMI Council
(Nordic and Western Russia), the Inuit Circumpolar Conference
(U.S., Canada, Greenland, and Russia), and the Association of
Indigenous Minorities of the North—Siberia and the Far East of the
Russian Federation.291
This relationship formalized in 1996, when the eight Arctic
nations signed a declaration that created the Arctic Council.292 Its
mandate is broad, but it does not address military security.293 Now,
the Arctic Athabaskan, Aleut, Gwich’in, Inuit, Sami, and forty-one
indigenous peoples of the Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North sit as Permanent Participants at the Council
meetings, along with elected and appointed government officials.294
The Arctic Council has acted as a self-described catalyst for
three international agreements entered into by the Arctic states
negotiating legally binding agreements.295 These are the Agreement
on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
in the Arctic (2011);296 the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013);297
and the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific
Cooperation (2017).298
The Arctic Council has organized initiatives on several items,
some of which we argue below should be elevated to binding law
status.

291 See id. at 1.
See generally INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ SECRETARIAT,
https://www.arcticpeoples.com/#ride [https://perma.cc/RCG2-C9CY].
292 See Ottawa Declaration, supra note 289, art. 1.
293 See id. at n. 1.
294 See id. art. 2–3 (providing a list of all members, observers and permanent
participants to agreement).
295 International Cooperation in the Arctic, ARCTIC COUNCIL: OUR WORK,
https://arctic-council.org/explore/work/cooperation/
[https://perma.cc/B9C7-ANAW]
(last visited Nov. 15, 2021) (listing the agreements the council is party to).
296 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in
the Arctic, May 12, 2011, TIAS No. 17-605, 50 I.L.M. 110.
297 Arctic Council, Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness
And Response In The Arctic, (May 12, 2011).
298 Arctic Council, Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific
Cooperation (May 12, 2011).
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d. Soft Law
Arctic countries also act in accordance with soft law, concepts
they wish to have influence: aspirations for the protection of the
planet.299 The term soft law refers to principles that may later
structure more formal rules and, in the meantime, can guide
discussion, negotiations, and even decisions.300 An example is the
Precautionary Principle. Found in the preambles of some treaties
and widely referred to by negotiators and scholars, it states, to use
the form coming from the 1992 Rio environmental meeting: “Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”301
In the Arctic, the principles are the underlying basis for
the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the
Central Arctic Ocean (CAOFA).302
Also, within the inventory of “soft law” in 2015, the United
Nations stated a set of international goals for sustainable
development.303 There are seventeen—those that are most relevant
to the Arctic include:
Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and
promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.
Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and
girls.
Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of
water and sanitation for all.
Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and
modern energy for all.
Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic

299 See Nevitt & Percival, supra note 242, at 1656 (explaining that “the Arctic region
lacks a unifying Arctic treaty and is governed by the newer ‘soft law’ global environmental
law model”).
300 See id.
301 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.
1), annex I, Principle 15 (Aug. 12, 1992).
302 Agreement To Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in The Central Arctic
Ocean, Oct. 3, 2018, https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/documents/pdf/ENCAO.pdf (entered into force Jun. 25, 2021).
303 See The 17 Goals, U.N. DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300 [https://perma.cc/CEG8-CBJ2].
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growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.
Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and
sustainable industrialization and foster innovation.
Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its
impacts.
Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and
marine resources for sustainable development.304

e. No more major rules?
In 2008, the five Arctic coastal states adopted the Ilulissat
Declaration.305 It concluded that there was no need for a new
comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic
Ocean.306
By virtue of their sovereignty and jurisdiction in large areas of
the Arctic Ocean, the five coastal states are in a unique position to
address these possibilities and challenges. Notably, the law of the
sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the
delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection
of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of
navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We
remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly
settlement of any possible overlapping claims.307
The Declaration suggests a geopolitical position that is
controversial among some non-Arctic nations.
Our
recommendations below do not subscribe fully to the Declaration;
we conclude that Arctic environmental governance and efforts to
maintain and further promote Arctic sustainability are not solely of
interest to Arctic nations.
f. National Law
Rules for Arctic environmental protection and sustainability
also come from the laws of the individual Arctic states themselves,
laws that apply in their Arctic territories. The inventory here is also
large. It includes “environmental law” but also laws not labeled
environmental, which often have great influence on the

304
305
306
307

See id.
See Ilulissat Declaration, May 28, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 362.
See id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
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environment. Many of the Arctic countries require environmental
impact assessments, wherein they consider the environmental
consequences before making a decision on actions that may harm
the environment. Arctic countries have laws on coastal zone
management, endangered species law, fisheries protection law, and
wetland protection, to name a few.
National rules can also extend in reach outside of a country; this
exercise of power is called the extraterritorial reach of domestic law.
Countries may claim extraterritorial effects for various reasons: one
is a state’s national security interest. There are several sources of
this authority, such as Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.308
g. Indigenous law
i. Understandings of this term
There are a number of understandings of the meaning of the
term indigenous law.309 However, each of them finds examples in
the Arctic. If understood as the norms and cultural practices of
indigenous peoples, “what had to be followed, done, or not done”
in indigenous cultures, they understand them independent of
codification or recognition by government they are many.310 If
understood as agreements between indigenous peoples and a federal
or other government in a country, these include those of general and
transformative influence that also implicate environmental
protection and sustainability, such as the Nunavut Land Claims
Agreement (Nunavut Agreement)311 and the Alaskan land claims
308 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, pt II, Principle
21 (Jun. 16, 1972) (requiring that countries ensure that activity within them does not cause
damage to the environment of another state or the global commons).
309 See PHILOSOPHIES OF POLAR LAW (ed. Dawid Bunikowski & Alan D. Hemmings
2020).
310 See, e.g., MARIANO AUPILAARJUK ET AL., INUIT LAWS (ed. Jarich Oosten, Frederic
Laugrand, & Willem Rasing 2017).
311 The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (Nunavut Agreement), between the Inuit of
the Nunavut Settlement Area and Canada. The Nunavut Agreement was ratified, given
effect to, and declared valid by the Parliament of Canada in 1993 with the coming into
force of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act. Prior to 1993, the Northwest
Territories Fishery Regulations provided the management regime for implementing
fisheries and resource management principles under the Fisheries Act. These regulations
continue to apply within the Nunavut Territory, but “they have not been amended to fully
reflect the principles and elements of the Nunavut Agreement.” Nunavut Fisheries
Regulations, FISHERIES & OCEANS CANADA (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.dfo-
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acts.312
Other more specific rules include the Nunavut Fishery
Regulations which aim to ensure fish stocks sustainably; they
recognize the Inuit’s existing approach to fisheries management and
harvesting rights.313
h. Arctic Rules from the Courts
Opinions or decisions of courts or other tribunals are also part
of the corpus of Arctic law.314 The inventory of cases is large.315
National court environmental cases are numerous, and climate
change is a major focus. A U.S. example is Native Village of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil.316 The Village of Kivalina sued over two
dozen energy companies in a California district court.317 It charged
that the companies’ massive greenhouse gas emissions resulted in
global warming, leading to severe erosion of the land where the city
is located.318 The suit, brought under the common law of nuisance,
argued that the companies knew that their operations were causing
harm and conspired to keep it secret.319 The lawsuit failed; the court
concluded that this is a politically charged conflict that the courts
are unfit to resolve.320
Kivalina is one example of the use of the litigation strategy that
started with some innovative lawyers in a small number of cases.
The number of climate-change-based cases alone brought before
U.S. courts reached more than a thousand.321 The number may grow

mpo.gc.ca/acts-lois/rules-reglements/rule-reglement35-eng.htm.
312 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629h.
313 Northwest Territories Fishery Regulations, C.R.C. c 847 (Can.).
314 The Sea Shepherd, the seal pups, and the Arctic Sunrise Russian piracy cases are
part of the jurisprudence influencing sustainability decisions in the Arctic.
315 See, e.g., the exhaustive treatment in the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at
Columbia Law School, https://climate.law.columbia.edu/ [https://perma.cc/9GCNUMJV].
316 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012)
(affirming the judgment of the district court).
317 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
318 Id. at 869.
319 Id.
320 Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d 849 at 858.
321 According to the Climate Change Center at Columbia University Sabine Center,
they have used both state law and federal law and a range of legal arguments. Parties use
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as science more accurately indicates specific causes of climate
change and those responsible.322
Causes of action and theories vary in these lawsuits. In 2013,
environmental groups unsuccessfully challenged the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s permits that authorized
exploratory drilling in the Arctic Ocean.323 The permits will result
in Shell emitting more than 250 tons of pollutants every year.
Environmentalists argued that greenhouse gases and black carbon
from ships would accelerate the melting of the snow pack and sea
ice in the Arctic in Native Alaskan communities.324 Claims under
the Endangered Species Act involve the listing (more precisely, the
failure to list) and conservation of threatened and endangered
species.325 Most U.S. courts have held that the effects of climate
change need to be considered when deciding whether to list species
and to determine their habitats, including in the Arctic. In one case,
pinpointing a habitat for polar bears was allowed to go forward,
even though the area was an industrial staging area for oil and gas
operations.326 In Canada, a case focused on procedures: a hamlet
was sued for failure to consult with indigenous peoples on seismic
testing in the Arctic.327
arguments based on legislation, federal law such as the Clean Air Act or the National
Environmental Policy Act; constitutional claims; state law; and common law civil actions
and creative new arguments.
322 In 2013, scientists linked 63% of cumulative worldwide greenhouse gas emissions
from 1854 to 2010 to just 90 companies. See Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic
Carbon Dioxide & Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel & Cement Producers, 1854–2010,
122 CLIMATIC CHANGE 229, 229 (2014). In 2015, the International Energy Agency used
data to estimate the total amount of emissions from the top twenty greenhouse gas-emitting
countries. The United States came in second, only behind China.
323 Resisting Envt’l Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL) v. U.S. EPA, 716
F.3d 1155 (2013).
324 Many cases brought under the federal air quality law have had similar fates:
petitions were denied, or claims dismissed. Environmentalists have, however, seen some
success.
325 See Barry Kellman, Climate Change in the Endangered Species Act: A
Jurisprudential Enigma, 46 ENVT’L L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10845, 10846 (2016).
326 Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 559 (9th Cir. 2016). See also
Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Prizker, 2014 WL 3726121 at *16 (D. Alaska, 2014) (finding
that the listing of a certain kind of bearded seal as endangered was arbitrary and capricious
when there was “no quantified threat of extinction within the reasonably foreseeable
future”).
327 A decision of the Supreme Court Canada in Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum
Geo-Services Inc., 2017 S.C.C. 40, 1 S.C.R. 1069 (2017), overturned a Canadian National
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The goals of lawsuits vary: some aim to move toward zero
emissions, some wish to keep all coal in the ground, some seek
sustainable development, some emphasize preservation, and some
push for remediating the damage already caused or paying for it.
This range of goals makes for varied plaintiffs.
i. A Public Trust?
Some actions are based on alleged violations of the public trust.
Under this theory, the atmosphere is seen as a resource that is
common to all people. Governments cannot convey, give, or sell
public trust resources to private entities except in very legally
constrained circumstances.328 Governments hold common property
resources—air, wildlife, water—in an endowment.
The
government is trustee, and it must manage the corpus or resource
for present and future generations; the trustees must protect the
assets. As stated in Illinois Central,329 “[t]he State can no more
abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested . . . than it can abdicate its police powers.”330 Public trustbased lawsuits aim at “decarbonizing the atmosphere” and “drawing
down” excess carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.331 Plaintiffs in a
Energy Board decision. The Board had allowed seismic testing relating to oil and gas
production in the Arctic Ocean, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the Board did not
properly consult with the Inuit of the area. There are many more lawsuits: an
environmental law group sues a natural gas provider for negligent management of
pipelines; governments are sued for alleged illegal approval of oil and gas projects;
governments themselves claim public nuisance for the way energy companies run their
power plants. Cases charge that company officials knew, or should have known, about the
climate impacts of their activities. National cases have been brought throughout the world.
They total several hundred in Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Germany, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, Uganda, the United Kingdom, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg,
Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and
Ukraine. In addition, cases have been brought by the European Union (55) and various
human rights organizations before a variety of tribunals. See THE CLIMATE CHANGE LIT.
DATABASES,
http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/
[https://perma.cc/2VNS-STHD].
328 See e.g. MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (3d Ed. 2021). On the seminal
articulation and explanation of the doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
329 Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
330 Id. at 453.
331 Mary Christina Wood, “You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle”: Environmental Law
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number of cases are children.332 They plead that they and future
generations will suffer the greatest injuries of climate change from
the government’s failure to protect the common atmosphere
today.333
The public trust doctrine has been applied in national courts in
the United States, India,334 the Netherlands,335 Pakistan,336 and
Uganda.337 Some mention the Arctic explicitly; others, were they to
succeed, would protect the Arctic environment by limiting fossil
fuel exploitation, helping villages hurt by climate change, and
requiring the study of damage to the Arctic for proposed new
projects.338
j. International Tribunals
Cases on climate change in the Arctic have been heard by
international tribunals.
The Circumpolar Conference, a
nongovernmental indigenous peoples organization, brought a case
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an organ
of the Organization of America States.339 The Circumpolar
Conference argued that climate change linked to emissions of
greenhouse gases in the United States violated their rights to
maintain a traditional way of life.340 In sections which highlight the
special importance of climate change in the Arctic, the petition
for a New Ecological Age, 50 NAT. RES, J. 167, 200–02 n.102 (2010).
332 See e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016); Filippone
ex rel Filippone v. Iowa Dep’t Nat Res., 829 N.W. 2d 589 (Iowa App. 2013); Funk v. Wolf,
144 A.3d 228 (Pa. App. 2016); Tex. Comm’n Env’t Quality v. Bonser-Lain, 438 S.W. 3d
887 (Tex. App. 2014).
333 Id.
334 Ridhima Pandey v. Union of India (OA No. 187/2017).
335 Foundation v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, HAZA C/09/00456689 (Netherlands
District Court 2015).
336 Leghari v. Pakistan, WP No 25501/2015 (Lahore High Court of Pakistan 2015).
337 Mbabazi et al. v. the Attorney General and National Environmental Management
Authority, No. 283 (High Court of Kampala in Uganda 2012).
338 The first few cases were dismissed. However, several cases have achieved
advances in the courts. In 2016, an Oregon court ruled that minors had standing to make
the public trust claim. An appeals court, in 2018, ruled in favor of the children, denying
the Trump Administration’s attempt to squash the suit. Juliana v. United States, 2018 WL
6303774 (D. Or. 2018).
339 Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Violations Resulting
from Global Warming Caused by the United States, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (2005).
340 Id.
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stated:
Several principles of international law guide the application of the
human rights issues in this case. Most directly, the United States
is obligated by its membership in the Organization of American
States and its acceptance of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man to protect the rights of the Inuit . . . .
The United States also has international environmental law
obligations that are relevant to this petition. For instance, the
United States also has an obligation to ensure that activities within
its territory do not cause transboundary harm or violate other
treaties to which it is a party . . . . The impacts of climate change,
caused by acts and omissions by the United States, violate the
Inuit’s fundamental human rights . . . . These include their rights
to the benefits of culture, to property, to the preservation of health,
life, physical integrity, security, and a means of subsistence, and
to residence, movement, and inviolability of the home . . . . The
United States of America, currently the largest contributor to
greenhouse emissions in the world, has nevertheless repeatedly
declined to take steps to regulate and reduce its emissions of the
gases responsible for climate change.341

Another case was brought before the Inter-American
Commission based on violations of human rights on behalf of the
Arctic Athabaskan.342 The Athabaskan Peoples, who have lived in
the Arctic regions of Canada and the United States for 10,000 years,
depend on the Arctic climate for survival.343 They argued that
global warming has changed the Arctic climate drastically,
damaging their lives, livelihoods, and culture.344 They sought a
declaration that Canada’s black carbon emissions violate the
American Declaration.345 They also requested an established plan
to help mitigate the effects of emissions in the Arctic.346
These actions also face considerable obstacles and have either
been denied or are pending after long periods of consideration.
Id. at 5 & 6.
Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from
Violations of the Rights of Arctic Athabaskan Peoples Resulting from Rapid Arctic
Warming and Melting Caused by Emissions of Black Carbon by Canada, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R. (2013).
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id. at 3.
346 Id. at 1.
341
342
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Nonetheless they bring international attention to climate change
effects on identified populations and provide ideas for strategies for
later actions. Also, other international law strategies might be
employed. For instance, the Convention Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries provides arguments to
pursue climate lawsuits actions in the Arctic, recognizing
indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and resources traditionally
occupied or used by them.347
k. Adaptation based actions
In the Arctic, climate change has already caused erosion,
extreme weather events, scorching high temperatures, loss of
hunting and fishing habitat, and destruction of traditional villages.
Therefore, regardless of the success of mitigation actions,
communities face great costs of adaptation to climate change.
Lawsuits attempting to address this side of the climate change
challenge seek remediation, reparations, and repair. For example,
in Conservation Law Foundation Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corporation,
plaintiffs sought to require management plans for energy facilities
that threaten the nearby environment.348
5. Effectiveness
The previously described encyclopedia of rules has contributed
to some success in environmental protection and sustainability of
the Arctic. Views as to how much has been accomplished vary.
The World Wildlife Foundation grades Arctic nations on topics
important to the Arctic environment.349 Canada earned the most
As—three for its successes in ecosystems-based management,
control of black carbon and methane pollution, and effective
management of oil spills.350 The United States and Denmark earned
the most Ds; they both received this grade on shipping control, and
the United States received a D for ineffective biodiversity

347 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Convention, No. 169, art. 14, 15 (June 27, 1989),
adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organization.
348 Conservation Law Found. Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 448 F. Supp. 3d 7, 12 (D.
Mass. 2020).
349 Arctic
Council
Scorecard
2019,
WWF
(Mar.
23,
2021),
https://arcticwwf.org/work/governance/acscorecard19/ [https://perma.cc/Z5AD-NGT8].
350 Id.
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protection.351 Denmark had this same grade for insufficient
protection of its conservation areas.352 Overall, across the countries
graded, good marks were given for ecosystems-based management
and use of environmental impact and risk assessment, and poor
marks were given for recognition of the equal partner status of
indigenous peoples in Arctic management.353
Rules that are most often characterized as helpful in the marine
environment include UNCLOS, the Polar Code, regional efforts to
create Marine Protected Areas, and specific fishing stocks
protection. For the air environment, good grades are often given for
the Persistent Organic Pollution Convention, the Paris Agreement,
the Ozone regime, controls on black carbon, and the Minamata
Convention on Mercury.354 As for species protection, whaling, seal,
and walrus management, the Polar Bear Treaty, and rules on
biodiversity protection have been at least somewhat successful. For
required procedures, Arctic observers find valuable the rules
requiring consultation with indigenous peoples, cooperation across
governments, and environmental impact assessment obligations.355
The Arctic experts (UCI survey) are generally positive about the
effectiveness of environmental governance of the Arctic but express
considerable concerns about gaps in the law. The Expert Group
addressed the following questions: (1) How influential has
environmental governance, specific or general, been in improving
Arctic
conditions?;
and
(2)
Is
more
international
environmental law needed to improve the Arctic environment in the
future? In the aggregate, majorities said yes.356 However, strong
opinions run contrary to these views, vehemently among some.
E. Future Rules; More to Be Done
To achieve a sustainable future environment of the Arctic, what
remains to be done? Policymakers, scholars, experts in and of the

Id.
Id.
353 Id.
354 Arctic Council Scorecard 2019, supra note 349.
355 Id.
356 See Arctic Survey, supra note 3. Once again, the responses are suggestive and not
statistically significant. As to the first questions, 60% chose either very or moderately and
40% chose slightly. For the second question over 70% said yes, despite strong commentary
that more law was not needed nor helpful.
351
352
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Arctic, and the literature from which we draw have identified gaps
where additional legal initiatives are necessary to assure the
sustainability of the Arctic. Not all recommendations are widely
shared. Some directly address a range of sustainability goals (such
as greater protection of the Central Arctic Ocean); others do so
indirectly (such as increasing the range of perspectives and goals in
environmental impact assessment); and some focus on specific
indicators (such as indigenous peoples’ empowerment). In this
section, we describe and analyze several.
1. More Fully Protect the Central Arctic Ocean from
Unregulated Fishing
There should be a commitment to making permanent the 2018
Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the
Central Arctic Ocean. The Agreement is in place for up to sixteen
years, renewable in increments of five years. There is an
opportunity to make it permanent through early international action.
Precedent exists (such as with other international agreements
including The Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement) for
changing political administrations in signatory states to back away
from additional commitments. Withdrawal under international law
is always a possibility; however, during this period of relative
consensus that the prevention of certain types of fishing in the
Arctic is important, safeguards could be created to make that action
much more difficult.
2. Protect Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction
The International Legally Binding Instrument on the
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity of Areas
Beyond National Jurisdiction should be completed and ratified. In
the alternative, Arctic states should create a comprehensive
protection regime for the ocean rather than waiting for the larger
international treaty.357
357 See generally Julien Rochette et al., The Regional Approach to the Conservation
and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 49
MARINE POL’Y 109 (2014) (stating that “the regionalisation of international law is an
important cornerstone of environmental politics as ‘not every international environmental
problem needs to be dealt with on a global level’”). See also De Lucia, supra note 227
(noting that arctic states “resist a global legal and governance framework for BBNJ,
favoring by contrast a regional approach that shall not undermine existing regional and
sectoral bodies and institutions.”); Christian Prip, Arctic Ocean Governance in Light of an
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The United Nations has for several years recognized governance
gaps related to marine biodiversity in areas beyond national
jurisdiction (ABNJ). In 2004, the UNGA established a Working
Group to study the conservation and sustainable use of marine
biological diversity in these areas.358 That working group later
recommended that a “process be initiated” by UNGA that could
include the development of a multilateral agreement on the topic.359
It might address marine genetic resources, including benefit
sharing; area-based management tools such as marine protected
areas (MPAs); environmental impact assessments; capacitybuilding; and the transfer of marine technology.360 In 2015,361 the
UNGA decided to develop an international legally binding
instrument under UNCLOS.362 However, on many crucial topics,
considerable divergence remained. Finally, in December 2017,
based on the recommendation of the PREPCOM,363 the UNGA
launched an intergovernmental conference (IGC). At the time of
this writing, the IGC has held three substantive sessions scheduled
in the resolution. As text-based negotiations finally started, based
on text prepared by the President of the IGC,364 matched substantive
progress has been slow. The proposed treaty is significant for the
marine Arctic because a large portion of the Central Arctic Ocean
lies beyond the jurisdiction of any state. Substantive rules adopted
under the new treaty, and rules that regulate the relationships
between the legally binding instrument (ILBI) and existing
institutions that have jurisdiction in the Arctic, have significant
implications for biodiversity protection.
The outcome can
determine, inter alia, an implementing mechanism for ecosystem
governance in the Arctic.365
International Legally Binding Instrument on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of
Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, MARINE POL’Y (forthcoming)
(suggesting that Arctic states can go forward with such protections rather than awaiting
the global instrument).
358 De Lucia, supra note 227.
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Vito De Lucia, The BBNJ Negotiations and Ecosystem Governance in the Arctic,
MARINE POL’Y 1, 1-2 (2019).
364 Id.
365 Id.
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3. Establish Additional Marine Protected Areas
The Arctic marine environment, rich in biodiversity, faces
unprecedented pressures from a changing climate that is rapidly
warming Arctic waters and melting sea ice, which in turn is creating
greater opportunity for increased shipping activities.366 Establishing
MPAs is one strategy for mitigating these threats. While there is no
single, universal definition of MPAs, the International Union for
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) defines an
MPA as a “clearly defined geographical space, recognized,
dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to
achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated
ecosystem services and cultural values.”367 MPAs may focus on
protecting “key ecological features” such as “species, habitats,
ecologically and biologically significant areas, geophysical
features, [and] landscapes . . . ecological processes and services”
such as subsistence harvest, and cultural values,368 such as
archaeological sites.369
In the Arctic, it is particularly important that MPAs are
established as a network of MPAs,370 which is “a collection of
individual MPAs or reserves operating cooperatively and
366 See Neil Bellefontaine & Tafsir M. Johansson, Arctic Oil Spill Intervention: In
Search of an Integrated Approach for the High Seas, in SUSTAINABLE SHIPPING IN A
CHANGING ARCTIC 255, 260 (Lawrence P. Hildebrand et al. eds., 2018); Protecting the
Artic, OCEAN CONSERVANCY, https://oceanconservancy.org/protecting-the-arctic/
[https://perma.cc/9C9P-3BGA] (last visited Feb. 2, 2021).
367 INT’L UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE, GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING THE
IUCN PROTECTED AREA MANAGEMENT CATEGORIES TO MARINE PROTECTED AREAS 1, 14
(2012).
368 Id. at 8.
369 See e.g., NOAA, MARINE PROTECTED AREAS IN THE U.S. ARCTIC 11 (2020);
Cultural Resources Inventory and Vulnerability Assessment at Bering Land Bridge
National Preserve and Cape Krusenstern National Monument, Alaska, NOAA,
https://marineprotectedareas.noaa.gov/toolkit/cultural-resources-case-study.html
[https://perma.cc/2X4N-2D5F] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021). See also Cultural Resource
Program in Cape Krusenstern National Monument Alaska, U.S. NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/cakr/learn/historyculture/program.htm
[https://perma.cc/G7HBL6DS] (last visited Feb. 27, 2022); Cape Krusenstern Archaeological District, U.S. NAT’L
PARK
SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/cakr/learn
/historyculture/nhl.htm [https://perma.cc/7C5E-B3UU] (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
370 See Radhika Kannan, The Effectiveness of Environmental Laws in Preventing
Transboundary Pollution from Oil Drilling in the Arctic, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 241, 279–
82 (2020); PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, AREA-BASED
CONSERVATION MEASURES AND ECOLOGICAL CONNECTIVITY 11–12 (2017).
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synergistically, at various spatial scales, and with a range of
protection levels that are designed to meet objectives that a single
reserve cannot achieve.”371 A connected network of MPAs can
better protect wide-ranging species, account for increased migration
caused by climate change, and connect fragmented habitat.372 This
“reflects a general trend within conservation science to move from
single-species to more holistic, ecosystem and ocean-wide
strategies.”373
There is no single authority governing the establishment of
MPAs. Rather, governments on the local, regional, national, and
international levels can establish MPAs through their own legal
mechanisms. For example, in August 2019, the Canadian
government in collaboration with the Qikiqtani Inuit Association
and the government of Nunavut established an MPA named
Tuvaijuttuq off the northern coast of Greenland and the Canadian
Arctic Archipelago.374 It is the first MPA to be designated by
ministerial order under Canada’s Oceans Act for interim
protection.375 The Oceans Act, enacted in 1997, provided an
unprecedented
framework
for
ecosystem-based
ocean
376
management. However, in the years following enactment, it fell
short of expectations and was recently amended in 2019.377
371 Christina K.A. Geijer & Peter J.S. Jones, A Network Approach to Migratory Whale
Conservation: Are MPAs the Way Forward or do all Roads Lead to the IMO?, 51 MARINE
POL’Y. 1, 1 (2015).
372 See, e.g., id. at 2; Radhika Kannan, The Effectiveness of Environmental Laws in
Preventing Transboundary Pollution from Oil Drilling in the Arctic 45 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 241, 279 (2020); JAMES HORROX, ENV’T AM. NEW LIFE FOR THE OCEAN 1, 6 (2021).
373 Geijer & Jones, supra note 371, at 1. PAME recommends “four key steps for
integrating connectivity into Arctic MPA management and network design” — “1) Define
conservation objectives;” “2) Synthesize information and identify important nodes
(existing or potential MPAs);” “3) Identify connections for species with planktonic life
history phases;” and “4) Identify connections for active swimmers and flyers.”
PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, AREA-BASED CONSERVATION
MEASURES AND ECOLOGICAL CONNECTIVITY 21 (2017).
374 Warwick F. Vincent & Derek Mueller, Witnessing Ice Habitat Collapse in the
Arctic, 370 SCIENCE, 1031, 1031 (2020). See also Tuvaijuittuq Marine Protected Area,
FISHERIES OCEANS CAN. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/mpazpm/tuvaijuittuq/index-eng.html [https://perma.cc/F5ZU-LND3].
375 Tuvaijuittuq Marine Protected Area, supra note 374.
376 See Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31 (Can.).
377 See id. at 57; see also Megan Bailey et al., Canada at a Crossroad: The Imperative
for Realigning Ocean Policy with Ocean Science, 63 MARINE POLICY 53 (2016); Oceans
Act, W. COAST ENVTL. L., https://www.wcel.org/oceans-act [https://perma.cc
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The Tuvaijuttuq MPA prohibits “new or additional human
activities” for up to five years in an area of unique ecological
significance378—a portion of the Last Ice Area.379 Scientists predict
this region’s multi-year pack ice will be the last remaining summer
sea ice in 2040 after all other summer sea ice in the Arctic has
disappeared.380 The Tuvaijuttuq MPA provides for some exceptions
to its prohibition on human activities including for Inuit wildlife
harvesting rights, marine scientific research, emergency activities,
and certain activities of foreign entities.381
There is debate over the optimal scope of MPA protections. The
establishment of MPAs has traditionally caused tension between
conservationists and the fishing industry.382 Some conservationists
advocate for strict no-take zones supported by evidence that “[n]otake marine reserves are by far the most effective type of MPA”
when it comes to the goal of protecting and restoring marine
biodiversity.383 However, there is growing recognition that
including local communities in establishment of MPAs can lead to
stronger MPA governance systems, providing benefits both for
conservation as well as for livelihood security.384
This
/HR58-6S56].
378 Tuvaijuittuq Marine Protected Area, supra note 374; Report on the Designation
of the Tuvaijuttuq Marine Protected Area, FISHERIES OCEANS CAN. (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/publications/tuvaijuittuq/designation/index-eng.html
[https://perma.cc/H78C-TATA].
379 The
Last
Ice
Area,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(June
2015)
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/projects/pristine-seas/expeditions/the-last-ice-area/
[https://perma.cc/SNE5-CJHR].
380 Id.
381 Tuvaijuittuq Marine Protected Area, supra note 374.
382 See e.g., Richard Stafford, Lack of Evidence that Governance Structures Provide
Real Ecological Benefits in Marine Protected Areas, 152 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 57
(2018); see also, e.g., Charlie J. Gardner et al., The Rapid Expansion of Madagascar’s
Protected Area System, 220 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 29, 34 (2018) (“[There is a]
growing body of recent research which finds little evidence for the effectiveness of
community-based, extractive resource management in conserving biodiversity in
terrestrial, developing world contexts, primarily due to the differences in objectives
between local resource users and conservationists, and the inability of resources users to
satisfy their needs through permitted sustainable uses.”).
383 Eric Sala & Sylvaine Giakoumi, No-Take Marine Reserves are the Most Effective
Protected Areas in the Ocean, 75 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 1166, 1167 (2018).
384 Richard Stafford, Lack of Evidence that Governance Structures Provide Real
Ecological Benefits in Marine Protected Areas, 152 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 57-58
(2018).
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“participatory governance” of MPAs is particularly important in the
Arctic where indigenous peoples have lived for millennia and
whose “spiritual and material foundations of . . . cultural identities
are sustained by . . . unique relationships to their traditional
territories.”385
Despite there being over 300 MPAs throughout the Arctic, a
majority of marine areas still remain unprotected.386 This is, in part,
because MPAs in the Arctic are all established under national
jurisdiction, which does not extend beyond the EEZ, leaving the
high seas largely unprotected by MPAs.387 However, even within
the EEZ, there is a need for greater coordination between Arctic
States to effectively protect marine areas from the transboundary,
cumulative impacts of fishing, shipping, and hydrocarbon
extraction.388 The Arctic Council should develop guidance on a
standardized approach to establishment of MPAs with specific
implementation timelines to help achieve greater, more effective
protection for the Arctic’s marine ecosystem.389
At the same time, a standardized approach should not sacrifice
the flexibility of MPA establishment not requiring pan-Arctic

385 Indigenous
Peoples
of
the
Arctic,
GRID
ARENDAL,
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/index.html?appid=2228ac6bf45a4cebafc1c3002ff
ef0c4 [https://perma.cc/4GAS-XFQD] (last visited Nov. 15, 2021) (citing Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities, Commission on
Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fiftythird Session (June 11, 2001)).
386 PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, ARCTIC PROTECTED AREAS
INDICATOR REPORT 6 (2017) (indicating that as of 2016, only 4.7% of Arctic marine areas
were protected). See also Explore the World’s Marine Protected Areas, WORLD
DATABASE
ON
PROTECTED
AREAS,
https://www.protectedplanet.net/marine
[https://perma.cc/A5ME-P36Q].
387 Millicent McCreath & Lawson W. Brigham, Challenges for the Establishment of
Marine Protected Areas in Response to Arctic Marine Operations and Shipping, in
SUSTAINABLE SHIPPING IN A CHANGING ARCTIC 297, 298 (Lawrence P. Hildebrand et al.
eds., 2018). The right of coastal nations to adopt unilateral regulations up to 200 nautical
miles from their coasts is given in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part
V. art. 234, Dec. 10, 1982, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 130-39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; Explore the
World’s Marine Protected Areas, supra note 386 (stating only 1.18% of the nearly 27
million square kilometers of protected marine areas is outside national boundaries).
388 See Radhika Kannan, The Effectiveness of Environmental Laws in Preventing
Transboundary Pollution from Oil Drilling in the Arctic, 45 COLUM. J. ENVT’L. L. 241,
280 (2020).
389 See id. at 279-80.
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involvement in certain areas.390 This is not to say that strengthening
legal standards for MPAs to enhance Arctic marine protection is not
warranted, because it is. Critics point out that “the Arctic
Council . . . has no power to establish legally binding duties for
member states.”391 UNCLOS “does not contain comprehensive
prohibitive or protective regulations for the marine environment”
and “only sets minimum standards for pollution protection.”392
Particularly in the ABNJ, where no single state has authority and
UNCLOS does not specify mechanisms for protecting marine
ecosystems, there is little incentive to establish MPAs.393 This
governance gap along with the lack of guidance on MPA
establishment suggest a need for a strengthened regulatory
framework, which could come from an agreement between the
Arctic States to give the Arctic Council the authority to create
legally binding MPA regulations.394
a. Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas
There are certain types of MPAs that focus on protections from
impacts related to shipping.395
One such comprehensive
management tool at the international level is designation of
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs).396 The International
Maritime Organization (IMO) has the exclusive authority to
designate this protected status through Assembly Resolution
720(17), adopted in 1991.397 The IMO defines a PSSA as “an area
that needs special protection . . . because of its significance for
recognized ecological, socio-economic, or scientific attributes
where such attributes may be vulnerable to damage by international
shipping activities.”398 The PSSA designation process is complex,
390 See generally, Tuvaijuittuq Marine Protected Area, supra note 374 (providing an
example of this approach).
391 See Kannan, supra note 370, at 259.
392 Id. at 260.
393 See id. at 259–60. For more, see Governing Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,
INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE: ISSUE BRIEF.
394 See Kannan, supra note 370, at 281–82.
395 Marine Protected Areas: Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, NOAA,
https://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_mpa-pssa.html [https://perma.cc/FAN7-PZZ3] (last visited
Nov. 15, 2021).
396 Id.
397 A. Res. 17/720, I.M.O. Doc. A/RES/17/720 (Nov. 6, 1991).
398 Id. at ¶ 1.2.
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involving sets of criteria and a multi-stage approval process. There
are three considerations required: (1) “the particular attributes of the
proposed area;”399 (2) “the vulnerability of such an area to damage
by international shipping activities;”400 and (3) “the availability of
associated protective measures within the competence of IMO to
prevent, reduce, or eliminate risks from these shipping activities.”401
To date, out of the 17 PSSAs the IMO has designated, none are
designated in the Arctic.402
However, this tool has been
contemplated and recommended for use in the Arctic.403 For
example, a 2015 case study assessing the potential for a PSSA
designation to protect “transboundary marine environmental and
cultural resources” in the Bering Strait region concluded such a
designation “holds the potential to benefit marine mammals and
indigenous communities in terms of resilience.”404
The
Pikialasorsuaq Commission has also recommended consideration of
PSSAs as a tool for protecting the Pikialasorsuaq, Canada and
Greenland’s North Water polynya, which is an area of “open water
that remain[s] ice-free throughout the winter due to ocean and wind

399 The area must meet at least one criterion from any of three categories: (1)
ecological criteria; (2) social, cultural, and economic criteria; or (3) scientific and
educational criteria. At least one of these criteria must exist “throughout the entire
proposed area, though the same criterion need not be present throughout the entire area.”
International Maritime Organization Res. A.982(24) ¶ 4.4, U.N. Doc. A.24/Res.982 (Feb.
6, 2006) [hereinafter Res. A.982(24)].
400 Id.
401 An applicant is limited to measures that have been adopted or will be approved by
the IMO. See Res. A.982(24), supra note 399.
402 See
Particularly
Sensitive
Sea
Areas,
INT’L MARITIME ORG,
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PSSAs/Pages/Default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/F232-VUS5].
403 See Specially Designated Marine Areas in the Arctic High Seas, PROTECTION
ARCTIC MARINE ENV’T, https://pame.is/projects/arctic-marine-shipping/amsa/speciallydesignated-marine-areas-in-the-arctic-high-seas [https://perma.cc/KP8B-CJ6P] (reporting
on the application of this tool in the High Seas of the Arctic.). See also Timo Koivurova
et al., The Arctic Ocean: Are We Ready to Govern a New Ocean?, in GLOBAL CHALLENGES
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 59 (Marta Chantal Ribeiro et al., eds. 2020) (noting the central
Arctic Ocean “appears to be a prime candidate” for designation as a particularly sensitive
sea area). But see Elise Johansen & Tore Henriksen, Climate Change and the Arctic:
Adapting to Threats and Opportunities in Arctic Marine Waters, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, OCEANS AND COASTS (Jan McDonald et al. eds., 2020).
404 Kevin Hillmer-Pegram & Martin D. Robards, Relevance of a Particularly
Sensitive Sea Area to the Bering Strait Region: A Policy Analysis Using Resilience-Based
Governance Principles, 20 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 25, 25 (2015).
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currents” and that supports a diversity of marine life “as a result of
the upwelling of nutrient-rich waters.”405
The centralized authority of the IMO facilitates a standardized
approach to creating PSSAs that the establishment of MPAs lacks.
The “high-level authoritative status of the IMO” also grants PSSAs
“unparalleled international recognition” compared to many other
marine protected areas.406 Further, the APMs are enforceable not
only against a state’s own flagged ships, but all ships in the area.407
The regulatory reach the IMO provides through PSSAs is especially
advantageous in that it can provide protections in international
waters—waters MPAs have been limited in their ability to
protect.408
PSSAs do have their shortcomings. Enforcement of APMs is
dependent on the flag state and port state compliance with
international regulations.409 However, in comparison to MPAs,
compliance with PSSAs is high, which is likely attributed to the fact
that APMs are IMO-endorsed measures.410 The IMO’s authority
does have its limitations. It is constrained by common international
law, which requires a balance between marine protection and
navigation rights, such that APMs are not permitted to unduly
interfere with the right to navigate in international waters.411
Further, PSSAs presents challenges even before reaching the
enforcement stage. Extensive, sustained political cooperation is
required to successfully implement this management tool in the first
place. In the case of the Bering Strait, for example, designation of
a PSSA would require overcoming tensions between the United

405 Report of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission, People of the Icebridge: The Future of
the Pikialasorsuaq: Executive Summary at VIII (Nov. 2017).
406 See Hillmer-Pegram & Robards, supra note 404.
407 See id.
408 See discussion supra on MPAs. A broad application of PSSAs could offer greater
protection against Arctic Ocean plastics pollution. See Janis Searles Jones et al.,
Advancing A Network of Safety Measures in the Bering Strait Region: Now Is the Time, 25
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 64, 121 (2020) (finding that PSSA designation provides
opportunity a number of protective measures).
409 Geijer & Jones, supra note 373, at 9.
410 Id.
411 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 37 Dec. 10, 1982, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 130-39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; see also, e.g., Nilufar Oral, PSSA for the Black
Sea, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 787, 799, 801 (2013).
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States and Russian Federation412 and, more generally, between the
shipping industry and some environmental groups. Notably, this
same governance challenge arises in efforts to establish connected
networks of MPAs.413
Despite the tradeoffs presented by MPAs and PSSAs, both tools
have demonstrated potential to provide effective marine protection
in the Arctic. More comprehensive and interconnected protection
is needed, and both MPAs and PSSAs can be implemented to
achieve such ecosystem-based protection.
4. Create an Active Arctic Regional Seas Programme with
Treaty-Making Goals
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Regional
Seas Programme (RSP) takes advantage of a comprehensive,
ecosystem-based approach with the objective of conserving the
marine and coastal environment on a regional level.414 It consists of
three types of Regional Seas Conventions and Action Plans
(RSCAPs): (1) those that have been established and are directly
administered by UNEP; (2) those that have been established “under
the auspices of UNEP,” but are administered by another regional
body; and (3) and those that have not been established by UNEP,
but cooperate with the RSP.415 The Arctic falls under this third type
of RSCAPs.416 The Arctic Council cooperates with the RSP through
its Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working
group.417 RSPs typically consist of a regional, non-binding action
plan supported by legally-binding conventions, and most have a
trust fund that is funded by participating states.418 While most RSPs
focus on addressing marine pollution, they can cover additional
environmental threats.419
See Hillmer-Pegram & Robards, supra note 404, at 26.
See Geijer & Jones, supra note 371, at 2.
414 See
Regional
Seas
Programme,
U.N.
ENV’T
PROGRAMME,
https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/oceans-seas/what-we-do/regional-seas-programme
[https://perma.cc/NYY6-T79Q] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
415 Id.
416 Id.
417 Heather Exner-Pirot, New Directions for Governance in the Arctic Region, ARCTIC
YEARBOOK 224, 233 (2012).
418 Kanako Hasegawa, The Regional Seas Agreements: Lessons Learned, 2 WWF
MAG. 9, 10–11 (2016).
419 Oran Young, Governing the Arctic Ocean, 72 MARINE POL’Y 271, 276 (2016)
412
413
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A regional seas agreement in the Arctic could facilitate the
management of shipping, fisheries, oil and gas activity, and the
development of protected areas. The recommendation to establish
an Arctic RSP first appeared in the 2015 Iqaluit Declaration, in
which Arctic Council Ministers established a task force to evaluate
the need for a regional seas program.420 The idea, however, has
mostly languished, partly because of some perceived weaknesses in
the UNEP RSP. These include restrictions due to strict adherence
to budget protection by U.N. agencies, over-extension of personnel
and financial resources, and the perception that UNEP is
“dominated by the advice of environmentalists, conservationists,
and academics” and fails “to give full consideration to the potential
contribution of the private sector.”421 This orientation could be
especially detrimental in the Arctic, where industry offers
considerable technical and scientific expertise.422
Despite these criticisms of the UNEP RSP, there is still a case
for establishment of an Arctic RSP.423 There are established RSPs
in place that can provide guidance in developing an Arctic RSP,
such as that in the Baltic.424 Arctic states can also benefit from the
experience of U.N. agencies and affiliated bodies who are actively
involved in RSPs. For example, UNEP provides technical support
for Action Plan development and coordinates regional activities
with global initiatives.425 UNEP is limited financially in that it relies
on funds provided by participating states, as mentioned above. To
(citing the OSPAR arrangement as an example of a regional seas agreement that covers
multiple issues in additional to pollution).
420 Iqaluit Declaration, ARCTIC COUNCIL, 6 (2015), https://oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/bitstream/handle/11374/662/EDOCS-2547-v1ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_Iqaluit_Declaration_formatted_brochure_lowres.PDF?sequence=6&isAllowed=y.
421 Roger D. Needham & Maureen Jedynack-Copley, The United Nations Regional
Seas Programme: General Guides and Principles, 14 CAN. WATER RES. J. 42, 44–49
(1989).
422 Id. at 44.
423 See, e.g., Amber Rose Maggio, Resource Use Conflicts in Arctic Waters: A Legal
Perspective, in ARCTIC MARINE SUSTAINABILITY: ARCTIC MARITIME BUSINESSES AND THE
RESILIENCE OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 443 (Eva Pongrácz et al., eds, 2020).
424 JOSEPH F. C. DIMENTO & ALEXIS HICKMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE OF
THE GREAT SEAS: LAW AND EFFECT (2012). For example, challenges resulting from
pollution from land can be addressed as they are covered in the HELCOM Annexes.
425 Kanako Hasegawa, The Regional Seas Agreements: Lessons Learned, 2 WWF
MAGAZINE 9, 11 (2016).
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address concerns regarding this challenge, Arctic states could use
their substantial influence to promote greater allocation of resources
to the UNEP RSP and to advocate for greater representation of
indigenous peoples in regional seas sustainability initiatives.
Alternatively, a regional seas program could be established
independent of the U.N. This may be the more feasible approach,
given the negative perception of UNEP and Arctic coastal states’
resistance to U.N. involvement and any arrangements that reduce
their decision-making authority in relation to non-Arctic states.426
As mentioned above, this was contemplated by the Arctic Council
when the United States was its chair from 2015 to 2017. That Task
Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation recommended a “new Arctic
Council
subsidiary
body
and
other
complementary
enhancements . . . to existing Arctic Council mechanisms.”427 A
second task force took up this mandate; however, at the direction of
Senior Arctic Officials, it focused only on complementary
enhancements of the Arctic Council institutions and not on the
recommendation for a new subsidiary body.428
Although the Arctic Council lacks authority to create legally
binding obligations for its member states, this is not an impediment
to negotiation of a legally binding regional seas agreement.429 An
agreement could be (1) negotiated by the Arctic governments,
which then establish links between it and the Council;430 (2)
undertaken under the auspices of the Arctic Council; or (3)
negotiated by member states with the aim of conferring
international legal personality to the Council, which would then
negotiate the agreement.431

See Oran Young, Governing the Arctic Ocean, 72 MARINE POL’Y 271, 276 (2016).
Report to Ministers of the Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation, ARCTIC
COUNCIL (2017).
428 Recommendations By The Task Force On Arctic Marine Cooperation II For
Complementary Enhancements Of The Arctic Council Institutions Including The SAO
Based Mechanism To Coordinate Marine Issues In The Arctic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL
(March 2018).
429 Sebastien Duyck, Legal Issues Related to Options for a Regional Seas-Type
Arrangement for the Arctic Ocean, N. INST. ENV’T & MINORITY L. 5, 5 (2014).
430 Id. at 15–16 (referencing the Jeddah Convention as an example of a regional sea
agreement linked with an existing organization).
431 Brooks B. Yeager, Coordinating Ocean Management in the Arctic: Options and
Possible Next Steps for the Arctic Council, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNS. (Mar. 25, 2014).
426
427
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5. More Fully Protect Cultural Resources
Each of the Arctic 8 countries are parties to the 1972 World
Heritage Convention,432 but there are few World Heritage sites in
the Arctic territories and there are no Intangible Heritage sites in the
Arctic. Several have been recommended or suggested.433
Important gaps exist in the rules that seek to protect Arctic
traditions, cultures including artifacts and sacred sites, and how the
rules are enforced. Custodians of these special places are stymied
for many reasons. Infrastructure construction does not always
recognize the existence or importance of sites deeply revered by
indigenous people. Meaningful protection can be seen as slowing
economic development. There is abuse through nonmanaged
tourism or exploitation of cultural treasures.434 Meanwhile, the
erosive and destructive actions of climate change continue to harm
these treasures. New approaches need to be created. These can
come from interpretations and applications of customary law, such
as the Precautionary Principle. Also, international human rights
law, including the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP),435 can be used to protect the cultural value to
indigenous people, which properly understood, is value to all
humankind.436
Indigenous people “can pursue further their right to maintain
and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their
432 World Heritage Convention, WORLD HERITAGE, https://www.iucn.org/theme
/world-heritage/about/world-heritage-convention [https://perma.cc/5YNR-T76J] (last
visited Oct. 5, 2021).
433 New Report Identifies Potential World Heritage Sites in Arctic Water, WWF (Apr.
4,
2017),
https://wwf.panda.org/discover/knowledge_hub/where_we_work/arctic
/publications/?297031/New%2Dreport%2Didentifies%2Dprime%2Dworld%2Dheritage
%2Dsites%2Din%2DArctic%2Dwaters [https://perma.cc/B4NX-MADD].
434 Heinamaki, Leena, Herrmann, Thora Martina eds., EXPERIENCING AND PROTECTING
SACRED NATURAL SITES OF SÁMI AND OTHER INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, SACRED ARCTIC (2017);
see also Marcus Eriksen et al., Mitigation Strategies to Reverse the Rising Trend of Plastics
in Polar Regions, 139 ENV’T INT’L. 105704 (2020) (focusing in part on management of
tour company operations).
435 G.A. Dec. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/61/L.67 (Sept. 13. 2007).
436 Sophie Starrenburg, Cultural heritage protection: a truly ‘global’ legal
problem?, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (Sept. 5, 2018), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/de/culturalheritage-protection-a-truly-global-legal-problem/ [https://perma.cc/W4WB-B23X]; see
also George Nicholas, Protecting Heritage Is A Human Right, CONVERSATION (Sept. 9,
2018),
https://theconversation.com/protecting-heritage-is-a-human-right-99501
[https://perma.cc/QN7P-SX7S].
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traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands,
territories, waters and coastal seas, and other resources and to
uphold those responsibilities to future generations . . . .”437 For
example, the Declaration is part of the foundation upon which the
Commission on Pikialasorsuaq based their argument on the
Icebridge, which is a migration route from North America
historically used by the Inuit who now live along Greenland’s
coast.438 The 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas
Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean mentioned earlier also reflects
an evolution towards the deeper integration of the Declaration in
multilateral law-making.
6. More Fully Incorporate Indigenous Knowledge and
Perspectives in Law and Policy-Making
Substantive rules and those on processes (environmental impact
procedures, citizen participation forms, and the make-up of work
groups) need to better recognize and support involvement of
indigenous people, incorporating their knowledge, views,
perspectives, and experiences as equal contributors to decision
making.439 At the international level, going beyond national
obligations (such as the Canadian duty to consult on decisions that
could interfere with domestic, aboriginal, or treaty rights), new
obligations should include a legal requirement to include indigenous
peoples in negotiating international environmental agreements and
rules on human rights.440
This change raises concerns about understandings of
sovereignty of the nation states in which indigenous peoples live. If
this group of interested persons achieves this status, may there be
437 REPORT OF THE PIKIALASORSUAQ COMMISSION, PEOPLE OF THE ICEBRIDGE: THE
FUTURE OF THE PIKIALASORSUAQ, A-19 (Nov. 2017), https://oceansnorth.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/Report-of-the-Pikialasorsuaq-Commission-Nov-2017.pdf.
438 Id. at A-6.
439 On approaches to promoting greater consultation and involvement, see Emma
Wilson, Indigenous Rights and Resource Development in the Arctic: An Overview of
International Standards and Principles for Consultation, Participation and Consent, in
REGULATION OF EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT IN THE ARCTIC
(Rachael Lorna Johnstone & Anne Merrild Hansen eds., 2020).
440 Risa Schwartz, Realizing Indigenous Rights in International Environmental Law A Canadian Perspective, 109 CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION 1, 1 (2017); see
also Somini Sengupta, Catrin Einhorn & Manuela Andreoni, There’s a Global Plan to
Conserve Nature. Indigenous People Could Lead the Way, N.Y. TIMES, A-13 (Mar. 12,
2021).
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pressure to generalize the increased role to other groups?
Furthermore, administratively there needs to be a way to identify
who is to be involved when there are many different tribes and
groups—some very small, some large and without shared
perspectives. However, as with other representational challenges,
institutions can develop means of selecting representatives,
including by having interested groups do so themselves.
7.

Stricter Liability Assignment to Regulate Offshore Energy
Installations
As Arctic sea ice melts, more opportunities follow for
exploration and exploitation of fossil fuels and for renewables,
which in various parts of the Arctic, include hydropower, wind,
solar, tidal movements, geothermal, and nuclear.441 Careful
management can limit damage to sea life, the waters, and coastal
communities. However, where it is absent and unforeseen
circumstances lead to pollution, death, damage, or destruction,
current international law that addresses what must be done is
limited. Furthermore, domestic laws of Arctic countries do not
create similar obligations.
International law on liability is encompassed in the 1992
International Civil Liability Convention for Oil Pollution Damage
(1992 CLC).442 That regime is made up of the Civil Liability
Convention, the Fund Convention, and the Supplementary Fund
Convention.443 All Arctic states except the United States are
members of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention. It applies to oil
pollution damages in the territorial seas and the EEZ of member
states. In a preventative provision, it also applies to collisions
beyond the territorial seas if those collisions create threats to cause
pollution within a member state’s territory.
Individual Arctic states have similar, but in important ways,
441 Magnus de Witt, Hlynur Stefansson, & Agust Valfells, Energy Security In The
Arctic: Policies And Technologies For Integration of Renewable Energy, ARCTIC
YEARBOOK, https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2019/2019-briefing-notes/329energy-security-in-the-arctic-policies-and-technologies-for-integration-of-renewableenergy [https://perma.cc/W9XE-7BPQ].
442 Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1969, Nov. 27, 1992, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255.
443 Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, Nov. 27, 1992,
1953 U.N.T.S. 330.
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different liability law.444
Shared provisions include those
distinguishing damages caused by fault, negligence, or violations of
statutory law from damages resulting from compliant behavior;
application of liability rules to specified territories and zones; and
compensation for economic losses to defined businesses, such as
fishing.
The harsh conditions of the Arctic indicate that, should there be
a significant spill, the existing legal regime will not be sufficient to
cover damages experienced in the North. Only reasonable costs are
admissible for compensation under Article VI(a) of the 1992
International Civil Liability Convention for Oil Pollution
Damage.445 Furthermore, the unique characteristics of the Arctic
environment leave unanswered and unchartered what would be
reasonable. Experts conclude that negative effects on biodiversity
in the region “may prevail for more than 50 years before natural
elimination processes make it disappear.”446 Finally, other than
IMO rules and those required by flag states, damages in the High
Seas, beyond the jurisdiction of Arctic nations, may not be
sufficiently covered. More developed rules on civil liability are
needed—for oil pollution, accidents, disasters, and even for
common activities such as discharges of bunker oil.447
Improvements in international law that would be helpful to
Arctic sustainability include a broader definition of “ship,” because
passenger ships likely will increase their use of Arctic routes for
their tourism value.448 Another change should expand the areas of
environmental damage coverage to include damage to the marine
444 See OIL SPILL LIABILITY AND REGULATORY REGIME, THE LAW LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER (June 2010).
445 Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, INT’L OIL POLLUTION
COMP. FUNDS, 11 (2008), https://iopcfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/WEB-IOPCText-of-Conventions-ENGLISH.pdf.
446 Ikler K. Basaran, Can the Civil Liability Convention for Oil Pollution Withstand
the Pressure of a Major Oil Spill in the Arctic Ocean?, ARCTIC YEARBOOK, 11 (2018)
(citing W. Ostreng, NATURAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC—THE CASE OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE, 83 INSROP
(1997)).
447 Elizabeth Kirk, Science Based Governance and Regulation of Arctic Energy
Installations, ARCTIC YEARBOOK (2018); see also Béatrice Schütte, Marine Pollution in
the Arctic Region: What Future for Civil Liability? - The Need for a Comprehensive
Liability Scheme, in TRANSFORMING THE OCEAN LAW BY REQUIREMENT OF THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT CONSERVATION (Patrick Chaumette ed., 2019).
448 Article 1 (1), 1992 CLS.
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environment. Now, claims are not recognizable for non-economic
damages such as loss of recreational fishing spots, whereas loss of
revenue for reduced income from parking or mooring fees is
recognizable.449
Increasing the limits on amounts to be paid may also be
advisable as melting increases the amount of shipping and perhaps
oil exploration in the Arctic.
Finally, should acceptable
international liability rules for the High Seas not materialize, nations
could extend national application of the CLC 1992 to oil pollution
on the High Seas. This change benefits both the would-be polluting
ship owner and the environment.450
Significant economic risks for investors could follow, which
might impede economic development relevant to the overall focus
on sustainability of peoples. The trade off on this policy choice is
merited as stricter liability rules could encourage other policies to
improve economies, such as focusing on renewable energy sources.
8. Mandate Environmental Studies in More Cases
Environmental impact assessment is widely undertaken in
Arctic nations; however, there are some gaps that limit its
effectiveness. Now, Arctic regions face increasingly significant
development pressures, including proposed large-scale projects,
such as international airports, ports, and energy production
facilities. There is a new scale of proposed project; new actors are
involved or wanting to be involved, and new impacts result from
changing climate. These changes suggest the need for greater depth
of environmental analysis.
Greater attention should be given to indigenous peoples’ inputs
and those of other Arctic inhabitants into the assessment

449 Basaran, supra note 446 (copying the Norwegian approach). See also id. at 12
(citing Working Paper on the Legal Framework for Civil Liability for Vessel-Sources Oil
Spills in Polar Regions, CMI INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP (2017). Recently, a
Russian company announced it had paid an almost $2 billion fine for a 2020 diesel fuel
spill of 20,000 tons in the Arctic. President Putin had ordered the company to pay for the
spill. Agence France-Presse, Russian Mining Giant Pays $2B Fine for Arctic Spill,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.courthousenews.com/russianmining-giant-pays-2b-fine-for-arctic-spill/ [https://perma.cc/HV5K-CTFX].
450 Working Paper on the Legal Framework for Civil Liability for Vessel-Sources Oil
Spills in Polar Regions, CMI INT’L WORKING GROUP, 52 (2017),
https://comitemaritime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2017-12-15-Civil-Liability-WPFinal.pdf.
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processes.451 Additional improvements are feasible: dissemination
of best practices for environmental Impact Assessment and
engagement in the Arctic for large-scale projects; integration of EA
and land-use planning and Arctic science programs; use where
appropriate of regional environmental analysis; and additions of
information on socio-economic conditions in the Arctic.452
EIA can be made stronger by including assessment not only of
hard or quantitative, but also qualitative, value-based, and
sometimes interpretive contributions. Also, impact assessment
should be done for privately negotiated agreements.453 Greenland
has adopted an approach to impact benefit agreements, whereby
negotiated agreements are part of the formal requirements for
Strategic Social Impact Assessments.454 These agreements are
arranged among project proponents, local governments, and the
national government bringing them into the context of public law.
9. Incorporate Elements of Ecosystem-based Management in
Existing Rules
The Arctic Council has a long history of effective coordination
and cooperation on issues well-suited to an ecosystem-based
management (EMB) approach.455 In 2004, the Arctic Council
Ministers adopted EBM as part of the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan,
and by 2011, an expert group led by the Protection of the Arctic
Marine Environment (PAME) working group was developing

451 Emerging Practices and Options for Effective Indigenous-led Project Assessment;
the Strengths and Limitations of Existing Indigenous-led Environmental Assessment in the
Arctic
Region
and
Elsewhere,
GWICH’IN
COUNCIL
INT’L
(2018),
https://gwichincouncil.com/sites/default/files/Firelight%20Gwich%27in%20Indigenous
%20led%20review_FINAL_web_0.pdf.
452 See Good Practices for Environmental Impact Assessment and Meaningful
Engagement in the Arctic, ARCTIC COUNCIL (May 2019), https://oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2377/Arctic-EIA_FInal-Report_May2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/YV92-D9EU].
453 Such agreements are commonplace in some Arctic regions, particularly in
Canada’s Northwest Territories and have become part of the reality of business practices
in the mining sector. (Veiga et al., 2001).
454 Bram Noble & Kevin Hanna, Environmental Assessment in the Arctic: A Gap
Analysis and Research Agenda, 68 ARCTIC 341 (2015).
455 See Joseph F.C. DiMento, Elizabeth M. Taylor, & Stephanie L. Talavera,
Advancing Ecosystem-Based Marine Management in the Arctic: Recommendations to the
Arctic Council Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation, U. CAL., IRVINE SCH. OF L. CTR.
FOR LAND ENV’T & NAT. RES. (Sept. 2016).
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guidelines for implementation of EBM in Arctic.456 In 2013, a
definition of EBM, principles, and recommendations were adopted
as part of the Kiruna Declaration.457 As agreed upon by the Arctic
Council Ministers, EBM is the “[c]omprehensive, integrated
management of human activities based on best available scientific
and traditional knowledge about the ecosystem and its dynamics, in
order to identify and take action on influences that are critical to the
health of ecosystems, thereby achieving sustainable use of
ecosystem goods and services and maintenance of ecosystem
integrity.”458
EBM is a place-based approach that requires a holistic
consideration of ecosystems.459 It recognizes that humans are a part
of ecosystems, and it is their influences on ecosystems that must be
managed, rather than ecosystems themselves.460 EBM highlights
the need for sectoral integration and underlines the importance of
thinking in terms of arrangements that are able to encompass a
broad range of specific concerns (e.g., ocean acidification or oil
spills). It involves “engaging a broad range of participants in
developing management options and reconciling conflicting
uses.”461 EBM efforts can benefit greatly from transboundary
partnerships and perspectives.462 Arctic marine ecosystems are
inherently complex and rapidly changing, and understanding of
their functioning is constantly evolving. EBM highlights the
importance of adaptable, flexible governance.
The Arctic Council has developed a framework for
implementation of an EBM approach in the Arctic.463 This

456 EA Guidelines: Implementing an Ecosystem Approach to Management of Arctic
Marine Ecosystems, ARCTIC COUNCIL (May 2019), https://pame.is/index.php/documentlibrary/pame-reports-new/pame-ministerial-deliverables/2019-11th-arctic-councilministerial-meeting-rovaniemi-finland/424-guidelines-for-implementing-an-ecosystemapproach-to-management-of-arctic-marine-ecosystems/file
[https://perma.cc/GD9DP4WB].
457 ARCTIC COUNCIL, SENIOR ARCTIC OFFICIALS’ REPORT TO MINISTERS, KIRUNA,
SWEDEN 24–28 (2013).
458 ARCTIC COUNCIL, ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT IN THE ARCTIC, 1 (May
2013).
459 See DiMento, Taylor, & Talavera, supra note 455; EA Guidelines, supra note 456.
460 DiMento, Taylor, & Talavera, supra note 455.
461 Id.
462 Id.
463 EA Guidelines, supra note 456.
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framework has six components: (1) identifying the geographic
extent of the ecosystem; (2) describing the biological and physical
components and processes of the ecosystem including humans; (3)
setting ecological objectives that define the sustainability of the
ecosystem; (4) assessing an integrated ecosystem; (5) valuing the
cultural, social, and economic goods produced by the ecosystem;
and (6) managing human activities to sustain the ecosystem.464
To a significant extent, implementing an EBM approach
requires coordination at the national level,465 working across
fragmented authorities and jurisdiction. This raises many questions.
What aspects of EBM in the Arctic necessitate (or would be served
by) international cooperation? What is the optimal combination of
legal/institutional arrangements to facilitate such cooperation?
What is less easily done than describing and advocating for EBM is
effectuating it. How should it be implemented? Should it be
mandated through law?
The activities of EBM are not actions readily directed by treaty
law.
Terms and required actions are subject to variable
interpretation. Indicia of compliance are difficult to articulate. Yet,
many in the international sustainability community recognize the
overall value of its approach to linking social and physical
environmental elements of ocean protection.
Soft law may be the most appropriate strategy at this point—at
least until more operational elements of EBM can be agreed upon.
One step above that in building the Arctic sustainability regime is
to incorporate aspects of it in existing rules, such as that of
environmental impact assessment.466 Finally, it seems reasonable to
explore adding it as an element of the Arctic Council linked science
cooperation agreement.
10. Other Future Actions
There are several other suggested Arctic initiatives that may
merit action. Some are narrowly focused. These include managing
more effectively ship ballast water and fuel content; adopting Arctic

Id.
This also includes subnational and indigenous governments in indigenous land
claim areas.
466 Such as being included in the “Access to Data” encouragement provision of Article
7. AGREEMENT ON ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL ARCTIC SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION, signed
at the Fairbanks Ministerial meeting, May 11, 2017.
464
465
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species focused treaties such as on the protection of beluga whales
(some sub-species of which are seriously threatened with one listed
under Appendix II of the Convention on the International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora); and creating binding
rules for Arctic hydrocarbon exploitation and for shipping
emissions.
Others are more general and ambitious, such as adopting a
comprehensive environmental protection treaty for zones of the
Arctic within the jurisdiction of individual countries.467 A few are
strongly advocated but not widely endorsed, such as removing any
distinction between Permanent Participants and Members of the
Arctic Council to make indigenous groups truly equal partners in
Arctic Council activities.
F. Conclusion
The existing regime of Arctic governance addressing
environmental protection and sustainability is fairly comprehensive.
It is also effective to a considerable degree. Components of Arctic
sustainability law are found in treaties, including some that are
Arctic-centered, global, and regional; in initiatives of indigenous
peoples; in customary international law; in national and subnational
law; in judicial opinions and decisions; and in soft law. UNCLOS
is fundamental to this system, but more targeted rules such as the
Polar Code, species-focused agreements, and native claims
settlement acts are also important.
However, there are identified gaps in the regime. These range
from the large scale, such as insufficient precautionary protection of
the Central Arctic Ocean, to the pollution specific, such as controls
on plastics. Several recommendations for initiatives to fill those
gaps are under consideration in various Arctic venues. Measuring
the nature and scale of the gap is a function of different
understandings of Arctic sustainability and priorities assigned to
various goals. The Arctic encompasses many interests in all of the
Arctic states, indigenous peoples, and non-Arctic states.
Additional initiatives offered recognize mature positions on
what sustainability means. Among the most widely advocated, but
467 This might mean strengthening provisions of UNCLOS as nothing prevents the
Arctic nations from working together for greater sustainability—UNCLOS provides a
floor, not a ceiling, for protection.
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by no means universally accepted (and with sometimes considerable
disagreement among experts) are to more fully protect the Central
Arctic Ocean; to adopt international measures to protect
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction; to give much
greater protection to cultural resources; and to incorporate more
completely indigenous knowledge and perspectives in law- and
policy-making.
Also, better regulation of offshore energy
installations, including through stricter liability assignment, should
be pursued. Additional marine protected areas need to be identified
and protected. Furthermore, greater use of environmental impact
analysis and its use across more projects will be productive. Other
initiatives such as strengthening regional seas environmental
cooperation and encouraging ecosystem-based management in the
Arctic can be achieved in a number of ways.
New hard law is not indicated for some of these
recommendations. Ongoing cooperative activities among interested
parties and interest groups in a variety of fora can help in moving
toward a sustainable Arctic. Finally, individual nation state efforts,
especially when aggregated, can increase the probability of longterm stability of the Arctic region.
The above initiatives represent an ambitious agenda. However,
despite tensions and conflicts that arise somewhat regularly, the
Arctic remains a region that Arctic nations and many actors (and
individuals) throughout the world wish to protect, preserve, and
sustain. Furthermore, these initiatives are not targeted to one central
source of sustainability law and policy. Rather, they can be carried
out in a decentralized manner through actions by Arctic
organizations, bilateral and multilateral actions, and cooperative
initiatives among national and sub nations governments and those
of indigenous peoples.
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